[p.1]

 The growth of the influence of the crown, at a period in the history of this country when government by prerogative had recently been subverted, and popular rights and liberties enlarged, attests the vital power of the monarchy. At the Revolution, the arbitrary rule of the Stuart kings finally gave way to parliamentary government, with ministerial responsibility. Such a change portended the subjection of future kings to the will of Parliament; but it proved no more than a security for the observance of the law. While the exercise of the royal authority was restrained within the proper limits of the constitution, the crown was shorn of none of its ancient prerogatives; but remained, as it had ever been, the source of all power, civil and ecclesiastical, – “the fountain of honour” – the first and paramount institution of the state. Its powers, indeed, were now exercised by ministers responsible to Parliament; and the House of Commons was no longer held in awe by royal prerogative. Yet so great were the attributes of royalty, and so numerous [p.2] its sources of influence, that, for more than a century after the Revolution, it prevailed over the more popular elements of the constitution. A Parliament representing the people little more than in name, and free, in great measure, from the restraint of public opinion, – which had not yet the means of being intelligently formed, or adequately expressed, – promoted the views of rival parties, rather than the interests of the people. This popular institution, designed to control the crown, was won over to its side, and shared, while it supported, its ascendency. The crown now governed with more difficulty, and was forced to use all its resources for the maintenance of its authority: but it governed as completely as ever.

Meanwhile every accession to the greatness of the country favoured the influence of the crown. By the increase of establishments and public expenditure, the means of patronage were multiplied. As the people grew more wealthy, considerable classes appeared in society, whose sympathies were with “the powers that be,” and who coveted favours which the crown alone could bestow. And thus the very causes which ultimately extended the power of the people, for a long time served to enlarge the influence of the crown.

Vast and various were the sources of this influence its sources. The crown bestowed everything which its subjects most desired to obtain; honours, dignities, places and preferments. Such a power reached all classes, and swayed constituents, as well as Parliaments. The House of Lords has ever been more [p.3] closely associated with the crown and its interests than the House of Commons. The nobles of every land are the support and ornament of the court; and in England they are recognised as an outwork of the monarchy, – a defence against the democratic elements of our institutions. The entire body is the creation of the crown. The temporal peers, or their ancestors, have all been ennobled by royal favour: many have been raised to a higher dignity in the peerage; and others aspire to such an elevation. A peerage of the United Kingdom is an object of ambition to Scotch and Irish peers. The spiritual lords owe their dignity to the crown, and look up to the same source of power for translation to more important sees. Nearly all the highest honours and offices are engrossed by the nobility. The most powerful duke, who has already enjoyed every other honour, still aspires to the Order of the Garter. The lord-lieutenancy of a county, – an office of feudal grandeur, – confers distinction and influence, of which the noblest are justly proud.[1] Other great appointments in the state and royal household are enjoyed exclusively by peers and their families; while a large proportion of the state patronage is dispensed by their hands. Their rank also brings them within the immediate reach of court favour and social courtesies, by which the most eminent peers naturally become the personal friends of the reigning sovereign. Accordingly, with some [p.4] rare exceptions, the House of Lords has always ranged itself on the side of the crown. It has supported the king himself against his own ministers; it has yielded up its convictions at his word; and where party connections have brought it into conflict with a ministry enjoying the confidence of the crown, its opposition has been feeble or compliant.[2] Nor has its general support of the throne been inconsistent with the theory of the constitution.

The Commons, on the other hand, representing the people, are assumed to be independent of the crown, and jealous of its influence. How far these have been their actual characteristics, will be examined hereafter:[3] but here it may be briefly said, that until the reform in the representation of the people in 1832, the counties were mainly under the influence of great and noble families – as they still are, to a considerable extent: a large proportion of the boroughs were either the absolute property of peers and their connections, or entirely under their control; while in many other boroughs the interest of the government was paramount at elections. The cities and large towns alone had any pretensions to independence. Except on rare occasions, when all classes were animated by a strong public opinion, the representation of the people and popular interests was a constitutional theory, rather than an active political force. Had there been no party distinctions, there could scarcely have been an ostensible opposition to any ministers whom the King might have chosen to appoint. Members of [p.5] Parliament sought eagerly the patronage of the crown. Services at elections, and support in Parliament, were rewarded with peerages, baronetcies, offices and pensions. Such rewards were openly given: the consideration was avowed. There were other secret rewards of a grosser character, which need not here be noticed.[4] Nor were constituents beyond the reach of the same influence. The collection and expenditure of an enormous and continually increasing public revenue provided inferior places, – almost without number, – which were dispensed on the recommendation of members supporting the government. Hence to vote with the ministers of the day was the sure road to advancement: to vote against them was certain neglect and proscription.

To these sources of influence must be added the loyalty of the British people. He must indeed be a bad king, whom the people do not love. Equally remarkable are their steady obedience to the law, and respect for authority. Their sympathies are generally on the side of the government. In a good cause their active support may be relied upon; and even in a bad cause, their prejudices have more often been enlisted in favour of the government than against it. How great then, for good or for evil, were the powers of a British sovereign and his ministers. The destinies of a great people depended upon their wisdom, nearly as much as if they had wielded arbitrary power. But while these various sources of influence [p.6] continued to maintain the political ascendency of the crown, the personal share of the sovereign in the government of the country was considerably restricted. William III., the most able statesman of his day, while representing the principles of the Revolution, was yet his own minister for foreign affairs, conducted negotiations abroad, and commanded armies in the field. But henceforward a succession of sovereigns less capable than William, and of ministers gifted with extraordinary ability and force of character, rapidly reduced to practice the theory of ministerial responsibility.

The government of the state was conducted, throughout all its departments, by ministers responsible to Parliament for every act of their administration, – without whose advice no act could be done – who could be dismissed for incapacity or failure, and impeached for political crimes; and who resigned when their advice was disregarded by the crown, or their policy disapproved by Parliament. With ministers thus responsible, “the king could do no wrong.” The Stuarts had strained prerogative so far, that it had twice snapped asunder in their hands. They had exercised it personally, and were held personally responsible for its exercise. One had paid the penalty with his head: another with his crown; and their family had been proscribed for ever. But now, if the prerogative was strained, ministers were condemned, and not the king. If the people cried out against the government, – instead of a revolution, there was merely [p.7] a change of ministry. Instead of dangerous conflicts between the crown and Parliament, there succeeded struggles between rival parties for parliamentary majorities; and the successful party wielded all the power of the state. Upon ministers, therefore, devolved the entire burthen of public affairs: they relieved the crown of its cares and perils, but, at the same time, they appropriated nearly all its authority. The king reigned, but his ministers governed.

To an ambitious prince, this natural result of constitutional government could not fail to be distasteful; but the rule of the House of Hanover had hitherto been peculiarly favourable to its development. With George I. and George II., Hanoverian politics had occupied the first place in their thoughts and affections. Of English politics, English society, and even the English language, they knew little. The troublesome energies of Parliament were an enigma to them; and they cheerfully acquiesced in the ascendency of able ministers who had suppressed rebellions, and crushed pretenders to their crown, – who had triumphed over parliamentary opposition and had borne all the burthen of the government. Left to the indulgence of their own personal tastes, – occupied by frequent visits to the land of their birth, – by a German court, favourites and mistresses, – they were not anxious to engage, more than was necessary, in the turbulent contests of a constitutional government. Having lent their name and authority to competent ministers, they acted upon their advice, and aided them by all the means at. the disposal of the court.

[p.8]

This authority had fallen to the lot of ministers connected with the Whig party, to whom the House of Hanover mainly owed its throne. The most eminent of the Tories had been tainted with Jacobite principles and connections; and some of them had even plotted for the restoration of the Stuarts. From their ranks the Pretender had twice drawn the main body of his adherents. The Whigs, indeed, could not lay claim to exclusive loyalty: nor were the Tories generally obnoxious to the charge of disaffection: but the Whigs having acquired a superior title to the favours of the court, and being once admitted to office, contrived, – by union amongst themselves, by borough interests, and by their monopoly of the influence of the crown, – to secure an ascendency in Parliament which, for nearly fifty years, was almost unassailable. Until the fall of Sir Robert Walpole the Whigs had been compact and united; and their policy had generally been to carry out, in practice, the principles of the Revolution. When no longer under the guidance of that minister, their coherence, as a party, was disturbed; and they became divided into families and cliques. To use the words of Lord John Russell, this “was the age of small factions.”[5] The distinctive policy of the party was lost in the personal objects of its leaders; but political power still remained in the same hands; and, by alliances rather than by union, the “great Whig families,” and others admitted to a share of their power, continued to engross all the high offices of state, and to [p.9] distribute among their personal adherents the entire patronage of the crown.

The young king, George III., on succeeding to the throne, regarded with settled jealousy the power of his ministers, as an encroachment on his own; and resolved to break it down. His personal popularity was such as to facilitate the execution of this design. Well knowing that the foreign extraction of his predecessors had repressed the affections of their people, he added, with his own hand, to the draft of his first speech to Parliament, the winning phrase, “Born and educated in this country, I glory in the name of Briton.”[6] The Stuarts were now the aliens, and not the Hanoverian king. A new reign, also, was favourable to the healing of political differences, and to the fusion of parties. In Scotland, a few fanatical non-jurors may still have grudged their allegiance to an uncovenanted king.[7] But none of the young king's subjects had plotted against his throne; and few could be suspected of adherence to the fallen cause of the Stuarts, which had been hopelessly abandoned since the rebellion of 1745. The close phalanx of the Whig party had already been broken; and Mr. Pitt had striven to conciliate the Tories, and put an end to the bitter feuds by which the kingdom had been distracted. No party was now in disgrace at court: but Whigs, Tories, and Jacobites thronged to St. James's, and vied with [p.10] each other in demonstrations of loyalty and devotion.[8]

The king was naturally ambitious, and delighted in the active exercise of power; and his education, –otherwise neglected,[9] – had raised his estimate of the personal rights of a king in the government of his country. So far back as 1752, complaints had been made that the prince was surrounded by Jacobite preceptors, who were training him in arbitrary principles of government.[10] At that time, these complaints were discredited as factious calumnies: but the political views of the king, on his accession to the throne, appear to confirm the suspicions entertained concerning his early education.

His mother, the Princess Dowager of Wales, – herself ambitious and fond of power,[11] – had derived her views of the rights and authority of a sovereign from German courts; and encouraged the prince's natural propensities by the significant advice of “George, be king.”[12] Lord Waldegrave, who had been for some time governor to the prince, describes [p.11] him as “full of princely prejudices contracted in the nursery, and improved by the society of bedchamber-women and pages of the back-stairs.”[13]

His groom of the stole, Lord Bute, – afterwards so notorious as his minister, – had also given the young prince instruction in the theory of the British constitution; and knowing little more than the princess herself, of the English people and government, had taught him that his own honour, and the interests of the country, required the extension of his personal influence, and a more active exercise of his prerogatives. The chief obstacle to this new policy of the court was found in the established authority of responsible ministers, upheld by party connections and parliamentary interest. Accordingly, the first object of the king and his advisers was to loosen the ties of party, and break down the confederacy of the great Whig families.[14]

The king desired to undertake personally the chief administration of public affairs, to direct the policy of his ministers, and himself to distribute the patronage of the crown. He was ambitious not only to reign, but to govern. His will was strong and resolute, his courage high, and his talent for intrigue considerable. He came to the throne determined to exalt the kingly office; and throughout his long reign he never lost sight of that paramount object.

[p.12]

Lord Bolingbroke had conceived the idea of a government under “a patriot king,”[15] –who should “govern as soon as he begins to reign,” – who should “call into the administration such men as he can assure himself will serve on the same principles on which he intends to govern,” – and who should “put himself at the head of his people in order to govern, or, more properly, to subdue all parties.”[16] But it had been no part of Lord Bolingbroke's conception, that the patriot king should suffer his favourites to stand between him and his “most able and faithful councillors.”[17] Such, however, was the scheme of George the Third.

The ministry whom the king found in possession of power at his accession, had been formed by a coalition between the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt. The former had long; been the acknowledged leader of the great Whig connection, and enjoyed extended parliamentary interest: the latter, by his eloquence and statesmanship, had become the most popular and powerful of the king's subjects The ministry also comprised the Grenville and Bedford sections of the Whig party. It was so strong in Parliament, that for some years the voice of opposition had been scarcely heard; and so long as it continued united, its position was impregnable.

But, strong as were the ministers, the king was resolved to wrest all power from their hands, and to exercise it himself. For this [p.13] purpose he called to his aid the Earl of Bute, and other secret counsellors, drawn from all parties. The greater number were of the Tory party, whose views of prerogative were Jacobite. According to Horace Walpole, “they abjured their ancient master, but retained their principles.”[18] It was the king's object not merely to supplant one party, and establish another in its place, but to create a new party, faithful to himself, regarding his personal wishes, carrying out his policy, and dependent on his will. This party was soon distinguished as “the king's men,” or “the king's friends.”[19] Instead of relying upon the advice of his responsible ministers, the king took counsel with this “double” or “interior cabinet.” Even his first speech to Parliament was not submitted to the cabinet council. It had been drawn up by himself and Lord Bute; and when Mr. Pitt took exception to some of its expressions, the king long resisted the advice of his minister. It had been usual for ministers to rely upon the support of the crown in all their measures. They now found themselves thwarted and opposed; and the patronage, which they had regarded as their own, they saw divided by the king among his new adherents and their connections. This “influence behind the throne” was denounced by all the leading statesmen of that time, – by Mr. Grenville, Lord Chatham, the Marquess of Rockingham, the Duke of Bedford, and Mr. Burke. Occasionally denied, its existence was yet so notorious, and its agency so [p.14] palpable, that historical writers of all parties, – while taking different views of its character – have not failed to acknowledge it. The bitterness with which it was assailed at the time was due, in great measure, to political jealousies, and to the king's selection of his friends from an unpopular party: but, on constitutional grounds, it was unquestionably open to the gravest objections.

A constitutional government ensures to the king a wide authority, in all the councils of the state. He chooses and dismisses his ministers; and this, – if it be his pleasure, without the advice of any councillor.[20] Their resolutions upon every important measure of foreign and domestic policy are submitted to his approval; and when that approval is withheld, his ministers must either abandon their policy, or resign their offices. They are responsible to the king on the one hand, and to Parliament on the other; and while they retain the confidence of the king, by administering affairs to his satisfaction, they must act upon principles, and propose measures, which they can justify to Parliament. And here is the proper limit to the king's influence. As he governs by responsible ministers, he must recognise their responsibilities. They are not his ministers only, but also the public servants of a free country. But an influence in the direction of public affairs thus limited, by no mean satisfied the ambition of the king. His courtiers represented that he was enthralled by the [p.15] dominant party, which had become superior to the throne itself; and that in order to recover his just prerogative, it was necessary to break up the combination. But what was this, in effect, but to assert that the king should now be his own minister? that ministers should be chosen, not because they had the confidence of Parliament and the country, but because they were agreeable to himself, and willing to carry out his policy? – And this was the true object of the king. It will be seen that when ministers, not of his own choice, were in office, he plotted and manoeuvred until he overthrew them; and when he had succeeded in establishing his friends in office, he forced upon them the adoption of his own policy.

The king's tactics were fraught with danger, as well to the crown itself as to the constitutional liberties of the people: but his personal tactics conduct and character have sometimes been judged with too much severity. That lie was too fond of power for a constitutional monarch, none will now be found to deny: that he sometimes resorted to crafty expedients, unworthy of a king, even his admirers must admit. But he had kingly virtues, – piety, courage, constancy, and patriotism. With a narrow understanding and obstinate prejudices, he yet laboured, honestly, for the good government of his country. If he loved power, he did not shrink from its cares and toil. If he delighted in being the active ruler of his people, he devoted himself to affairs of state, even more laboriously than his ministers. If he was jealous of the authority of the crown, [p.16] he was not less jealous of the honour and greatness of his people. A just recognition of the personal merits of the king himself, enables us to judge more freely of the constitutional tendency and results of his policy.

To revert to a polity under which kings had governed, and ministers had executed their orders, was in itself a dangerous retrogression in the principles of constitutional government. If the crown, and not its ministers, had governed, how could the former do no wrong, and the latter be responsible? If ministers were content to accept responsibility without power, the crown could not escape its share of blame. Hence the chief safeguard of the monarchy was endangered. But the liberties of the people were exposed to greater peril than the crown. Power proceeding from the king, and exercised by himself in person, is irreconcilable with popular government. It constitutes the main distinction between an absolute and a constitutional monarchy. The best and most enlightened of kings, governing from above, will press his own policy upon his subjects. Choosing his ministers from considerations personal to himself, – directing their acts, – upholding them as his own servants, – resenting attacks upon them as disrespectful to himself, – committed to their measures, and resolved to enforce them, – viewing men and things from the elevation of a court, instead of sharing the interests and sympathies of the people, – how can he act in harmony with popular influences?

The system of government which George III found in operation was indeed imperfect. The [p.17] influence of the crown, as exercised by ministers, prevailed over the more popular elements of the constitution. The great nobles were too powerful. A Parliament, without adequate representation of the people, and uncontrolled by public opinion, was generally subservient to ministers: but with all its defects, it was still a popular institution. If not freely elected by the people, it was yet composed of men belonging to various classes of society, and sharing their interests and feelings. The statesmen, who were able by their talents and influence to command its confidence, became the ministers of the crown; and power thus proceeded from below, instead of from above. The country was governed by its ablest men, and not by favourites of the court. The proper authority of Parliament was recognised; and nothing was wanting in the theory of constitutional government, but an improved constitution of Parliament itself. This system, however, the king was determined to subvert. He was jealous of ministers who derived their authority from Parliament rather than from himself, and of the parliamentary organisation which controlled his power. The policy which he adopted, and its results, are among the most critical events in the history of the crown.

The dissolution of Parliament, shortly after his accession, afforded an opportunity of strengthening the parliamentary connection of the king's friends. Parliament was kept sitting while the king and Lord Bute were making out lists of the court candidates, and [p.18] using every exertion to secure their return. The king not only wrested government boroughs from the ministers, in order to nominate his own friends, but even encouraged opposition to such ministers as he conceived not to be in his interest.[21]

At the meeting at the Cockpit,[22] the night before the assembling of the new Parliament, to hear the king's speech read, and to agree upon the choice of a speaker, not only the Whigs and parliamentary supporters of the government attended; but also the old Tories, in a strong body, though without any invitation from ministers.[23] The speaker selected by Lord Bute was Sir John Cust, a country gentleman and a Tory.

Lord Bute, the originator of the new policy, was not personally well qualified for its successful promotion. He was not connected with the great families who had acquired a preponderance of political influence: he was no parliamentary debater: his manners were unpopular: he was a courtier rather than a politician: his intimate relations with the Princess of Wales were an object [p.19] of scandal; and, above all, he was a Scotchman. The jealousy of foreigners, which had shown itself in hatred of the Hanoverians, was now transferred to the Scottish nation, whose connection with the late civil war had exposed them to popular obloquy. The scheme was such as naturally occurred to a favourite: but it required more than the talents of a favourite to accomplish. While only in the king's household, his influence was regarded with jealousy: remarks were already made upon the unlucky circumstance of his being a “Scot;” and popular prejudices were aroused against him, before he was ostensibly concerned in public affairs. Immediately after the king's accession, he had been made a privy councillor, and admitted into the cabinet. An arrangement was soon afterwards concerted, by which Lord Holdernesse retired from office with a pension, and Lord Bute succeeded him as secretary of state.

It was now the object of the court to break up the existing ministry, and to replace it with another, formed from among the king's friends. Had the ministry been united, and had the chiefs reposed confidence in one another, it would have been difficult to overthrow them. But there were already jealousies amongst them, which the court lost no opportunity of fomenting.[24] A breach soon arose [p.20] between Mr. Pitt, the most powerful and popular of the ministers, and his colleagues. He desired to strike a sudden blow against Spain, which had concluded a secret treaty of alliance with France, then at war with this country.[25] Though war minister, he was opposed by all his colleagues except Lord Temple. He bore himself haughtily at the council, – declaring that he had been called to the ministry by the voice of the people, and that he could not be responsible for measures which he was no longer allowed to guide. Being met with equal loftiness in the cabinet, he was forced to tender his resignation.[26]

The king overpowered the retiring minister with kindness and condescension. He offered the barony of Chatham to his wife, and to himself an annuity of 3,000l. a year for three lives.[27] The minister had deserved these royal favours, and he accepted them, but at the cost of his popularity. It was an artful stroke of policy, thus at once to conciliate and weaken the popular statesman, whose opposition was to be dreaded, – and it succeeded. [p.21] The same Gazette which announced his resignation, also trumpeted forth the peerage and the pension, and was the signal for clamours against the public favourite.

On the retirement of Mr. Pitt, Lord Bute became the most influential of the ministers. He undertook the chief management of public affairs in the cabinet, and the sole direction of the House of Lords.[28] He consulted none of his colleagues, except Lord Egremont and Mr. George Grenville.[29] His ascendency provoked the jealousy and resentment of the king's veteran minister, the Duke of Newcastle. For years he had distributed all the patronage of the crown, but it was now wrested from his hands, nor was he consulted as to its disposal. The king himself created seven peers, without even acquainting him with their creation.[30] Lord Bute gave away, places and pensions to his own friends, and paid no attention to the recommendations of the duke. At length, in May 1762, his grace, after frequent disagreements in the cabinet, and numerous affronts, was obliged to resign.[31]

[p.22]

And now, the object of the court being at length attained, Lord Bute was immediately placed at the head of affairs, as First Lord of the Treasury. Rapid had been the rise of the king's favourite. In thirteen months he had been groom of the stole, a privy councillor, ranger of Richmond Park, secretary of state, and premier;[32] and these favours were soon followed by his installation as a Knight of the Garter, at the same time as the king's own brother. Prince William. His sudden elevation resembled that of an eastern vizier, rather than the toilsome ascent of a British statesman. But the confidence of his royal master served to aggravate the jealousies by which the new minister was surrounded, to widen the breach between himself and the leaders of the Whig party, and to afford occasion for popular reproaches. It has been insinuated that he was urged forward by secret enemies, in order to insure his speedier fall;[33] and it is certain that, had he been contented with a less prominent place, the consummation of his peculiar policy could have been more securely, and perhaps more successfully, accomplished.

The king and his minister were resolved to carry matters with a high hand;[34] and their arbitrary attempts to coerce and intimidate opponents disclosed their imperious views of prerogative. Preliminaries of a treaty of peace with France having been agreed upon, against [p.23] which a strong popular feeling was aroused, the king's vengeance was directed against all who ventured to disapprove them.

The Duke of Devonshire having declined to attend the council summoned to decide upon the peace, was insulted by the king, and forced to resign his office of Lord Chamberlain.[35] A few days afterwards the king, with his own hand, struck his grace's name from the list of privy councillors. For so great a severity the only precedents in the late reign were those of Lord Bath and Lord George Sackville; “the first,” says Walpole, “in open and virulent opposition; the second on his ignominious sentence after the battle of Minden.”[36] No sooner had Lord Rockingham heard of the treatment of the Duke of Devonshire, than he sought an audience of the king; and having stated that those “who had hitherto deservedly had the greatest weight in the country were now driven out of any share in the government, and marked out rather as objects of his Majesty's displeasure than of his favour,” resigned his place in the household.[37]

A more general proscription of the Whig nobles soon followed. The Dukes of Newcastle and Grafton, and the Marquess of Rockingham, having presumed, as peers of Parliament, to express their disapprobation of the peace, were dismissed from the lord-lieutenancies of their counties.[38] The Duke of [p.24] Devonshire, in order to share the fate of his friends and avoid the affront of dismissal, resigned the lieutenancy of his county.[39]

Nor was the vengeance of the court confined to the heads of the Whig party. Not only were all parliamentary placemen, who had voted against the preliminaries of peace, dismissed: but their humble friends and clients were also proscribed. Clerks were removed from public offices, and inferior officers from the customs and excise, and other small appointments, for no other offence than that of having been appointed by their obnoxious patrons.[40] While bribes were lavished to purchase adhesion to the court policy, the king and his advisers determined to discourage opposition with unsparing severity. Great lords must be humbled, parties overborne, and Parliament reduced to subjection.

The preliminaries of peace were approved by Parliament; and the Princess of Wales, exulting in the success of the court, exclaimed, “Now my son is king of England.”[41] But her exultation was premature. As yet there had been little more than a contention for power, between rival parties in the aristocracy: but these stretches of prerogative served to unite the Whigs into an organised opposition. Since the accession of the House of Hanover, this party had supported the crown, as ministers. It now became their office to assert the liberties of the people, and to resist the [p.25] encroachments of prerogative. Thus the king's attempt to restore the personal influence of the Sovereign, which the Revolution had impaired, so far from strengthening the throne, advanced the popular cause, and gave it powerful leaders, whose interests had hitherto been enlisted on the side of the crown. Claims of prerogative became the signal for the assertion of new rights and liberties, on the part of the people.

The fall of the king's favoured minister was even more sudden than his rise. He shrank from the difficulties of his position, – a disunited cabinet, – a formidable opposition, – doubtful support from his friends, – the bitter hatred of his enemies, – a libellous press, – and notorious unpopularity.[42] Afraid, as he confessed, “not only of falling himself, but of involving his royal master in his ruin,” he resigned suddenly, – to the surprise of all parties, and even of the king himself, – before he had held office for eleven mouths. But his short administration had indulged the king's love of rule, and encouraged him to proceed with his cherished scheme for taking a dominant part in the direction of public affairs.

Nor did Lord Bute propose to relinquish his own power together with his office. Having negotiated the appointment of Mr. George Grenville as his successor, and arranged with him the nomination of the cabinet,[43] he retreated to [p.26] the interior cabinet, whence he could direct more securely the measures of the court.[44] The ministry of Mr Grenville was constituted in a manner favourable to the king's personal views; and was expected to be under the control of himself and his favourite. And at first there can be little doubt that Mr. Grenville found himself the mere agent of the court. “The public looked still at Lord Bute through the curtain,” said Lord Chesterfield, “which indeed was a very transparent one.” But Mr. Grenville was by no means contented with the appearance of power. He was jealous of Lord Bute's superior influence, and complained to the king that his Majesty's confidence was withheld from his minister.[45] As fond of power as the king himself, – and with a will as strong and imperious, – tenacious of his rights as a minister, and confident in his own abilities and influence, – he looked to Parliament rather than to the crown, as the source of his authority.

The king finding his own scheme of government opposed, and disliking the uncongenial views and hard temper of his ministers resolved to dismiss him on the first convenient opportunity.[46] Accordingly, on the death of Lord Egremont, he commissioned Lord Bute to open negotiations with Mr. Pitt, for the formation of a new administration. And now the king tasted the bitter fruits of his recent policy. He had [p.27] proscribed the Whig leaders. He had determined “never upon any account to suffer those ministers of the late reign, who had attempted to fetter and enslave him, to come into his service, while he lived to hold the sceptre.”[47] Yet these were the very ministers whom Mr. Pitt proposed to restore to power; and stranger still, – the premier in whom the king was asked to repose his confidence was Earl Temple, whose patronage of Wilkes had recently aroused his bitter resentment. His Majesty was not likely so soon to retract his resolution, and refused these hateful terms: “My honour is concerned,” he said, “and I must support it.”[48] The Grenville ministry, however distasteful, was not so hard to bear as the restoration of the dreaded Whigs; and he was therefore obliged to retain it. Mr. Grenville now remonstrated, more strongly than ever, against the influence of the favourite who had been employed to supplant him: the king promised his confidence to the ministers, and Lord Bute retired from the court.[49]

Though George III. and Mr. Grenville differed as to their relative powers, they were but too well agreed in their policy. Both were arbitrary, impatient of opposition, and resolute in the exercise of authority. The chief claims of the Grenville ministry to distinction [p.28] were its arbitrary proceedings against Wilkes, which the king encouraged and approved,[50] and the first taxation of America, which he himself is said to have suggested.[51] In overawing opponents the king was more forward than his ministers.[52] Earl Temple's friendship for Wilkes was punished by the erasure of his name from the list of privy councillors, and by dismissal from the lord-lieutenancy of his county.[53] General Conway, Colonel Barré, and Colonel A'Court, were, for their votes in Parliament, deprived of their military commands,[54] and Lord Shelburne of his office of aide-de-camp to his Majesty.

The privileges of Parliament afforded no protection from the king's displeasure. To guard against the arbitrary interference of the crown, freedom of speech had been asserted for centuries. It was an acknowledged constitutional doctrine that the king should be deaf to reports of debates in Parliament, and that no member should suffer molestation for his speeches.[55] Nor had any king of the house of Hanover been present [p.29] at the deliberations of the legislature.[56] Yet during the proceedings of the Commons against Wilkes, his Majesty found a faithful reporter in Mr. Grenville. Watching the debates and divisions, he kept a jealous eye upon the opinions and votes of every member; and expressed his personal resentment against all who did not support the government. It was he who first proposed the dismissal of General Conway, “both from his civil and military commissions:” it was he who insisted on the removal of Mr. Fitzherbert from the Board of Trade, and of all placemen who took a different view of parliamentary privilege from that adopted by the court.[57] Mr. Grenville endeavoured to moderate the king's severity: he desired to postpone such violent measures till the proceedings against Wilkes should be concluded;[58] and in the meantime, opened communications with General Conway, in the hope of averting his dismissal.[59] But at length the blow was struck, and General Conway was dismissed not only from his office of groom of the bedchamber, but from the command of his regiment of dragoons.[60] [p.30] Mr. Calcraft was also deprived of the office of deputy-muster-master.[61]

To commit General Conway or Colonel Barré to prison, as James I. had committed Sir Edwin Sandys, and as Charles I. had committed Selden and other leading members of the House of Commons, could not now have been attempted. Nor was the illomened venture of Charles I. against the five members likely to be repeated: but the king was violating the same principles of constitutional government as his arbitrary predecessors. He punished, as far as he was able, those who had incurred his displeasure, for their conduct in Parliament; and denied them the protection which they claimed from privilege, and the laws of their country. Yet the Commons submitted to this violation of their freedom, with scarcely a murmur.[62]

The riots and popular discontents of this period ought to have convinced the king that his statesmanship was not successful. He had already sacrificed his popularity to an ill-regulated love of power. But he continued to direct every measure of the government, whether of legislation, of administration, or of patronage; and by means of the faithful reports of his minister, he constantly assisted, as it were, in the deliberations of Parliament.[63]

[p.31]

In 1765, differences again arose between the king and the Grenville ministry. They had justly offended him by their mismanagement of the Regency Bill,[64] – they had disputed with him on questions of patronage and expenditure, – they had wearied him with long arguments in the closet;[65] and, in the month of May, he intimated his intention of dispensing with their services. But the king, after vain negotiations with Mr. Pitt through the Duke of Cumberland, finding himself unable to form another administration, was again compelled to retain them in office. They had suspected the secret influence of Lord Bute in thwarting their counsels; and to him they attributed their dismissal.[66] The first condition, therefore, on which they consented to remain in office, was that Lord Bute should not be suffered to interfere in his Majesty's councils, 'in any manner or shape whatever.”[67] To this the king pledged himself,[68] and though suspicions of a secret correspondence with [p.32] Lord Bute were still entertained, there is every reason for believing that he adhered to his promise.[69] Indeed, he had already acquired so much confidence in his own aptitude for business, that he no longer relied upon the counsels of his favourite.[70] He was able to rule alone; and wanted instruments, rather than advisers. The second condition was the dismissal of Mr. Stuart Mackenzie, Lord Bute's brother, from the office of privy seal in Scotland, and from the management of the affairs of that country. In this, too, the king yielded, though sorely against his will, as he had promised the office for life.[71] Meanwhile the breach between the king and his ministers became still wider. They had been forced upon him by necessity: they knew that he was plotting their speedy overthrow, and protested against the intrigues by which their influence was counteracted. The Duke of Bedford besought the king “to permit his authority and his favour to go [p.33] together;[72]” and these remonstrances were represented by the king's friends as insolent and overbearing.[73] An outcry was raised against the ministers that they “desired to enslave the king,” who was now determined to make any sacrifices to get rid of them.

The negotiations for a new ministry were again conducted on behalf of the king:, by his uncle the Duke of Cumberland. Such was the popular hatred of Lord Bute and his countrymen, that the Duke's former severities against the Scotch, which had gained for him the name of the “butcher,” were now a claim to popular favour. The rebellious Scots had been treated as they deserved; and he who had already chastised them, was not the man to favour their pretensions at court. These negotiations were protracted for seven weeks, while the country was virtually without a government.[74] Mr. Pitt was again impracticable: the further continuance of the Grenville ministry could not be endured; and, at length, the king was reduced to the necessity of surrendering himself once more to the very men whom he most dreaded.

The Marquess of Rockingham, the leader of the obnoxious Whig aristocracy, – the statesman whom he had recently removed from his lieutenancy, – the king was now obliged to accept as premier; and General Conway, whom [p.34] he had deprived of his regiment, became a secretary of state, and leader of the House of Commons. The policy of proscription was, for a time at least, reversed and condemned. Mr. Pitt, when solicited by the Duke of Cumberland to take office, had named as one of his conditions, the restoration of officers dismissed on political grounds. This the king had anticipated, and was prepared to grant.[75] The Rockingham administration insisted on the same terms; and according to Mr. Burke “discountenanced, and it is hoped for ever abolished, the dangerous and unconstitutional practice of removing military officers, for their votes in Parliament.”[76]

The Whig leaders were not less jealous of the influence of Lord Bute, than the ministry whom they displaced; and before they would accept office, they insisted “that the thought of replacing Mr. Mackenzie should be laid aside; and also that some of the particular friends of the Earl of Bute should be removed, as a proof to the world that the Earl of Bute should not either publicly or privately, directly or indirectly, have any concern or influence in public affairs, or in the management or disposition of public employments.[77] These conditions being agreed to, a ministry so constituted was likely to be independent of court influence: yet it was soon reproached with [p.35] submission to the “interior cabinet.” Mr. Pitt said, “Methinks I plainly discover the traces of an overruling influence;” and while he disavowed aay prejudice against the country of Lord Bute, he declared that “the men of that country wanted wisdom, and held principles incompatible with freedom.” This supposed influence was disclaimed on the part of the government by General Conway: “I see nothing of it,” said he, “I feel nothing of it: I disclaim it for myself, and as far as my discernment can reach, for the rest of his Majesty's ministers.[78]

Whether Lord Bute had, at this time, any influence at court, was long a subject of doubt and controversy. It was confidently believed by the public, and by many of the best informed of his contemporaries; but Lord Bute, several years afterwards, so explicitly denied it, that his denial may be accepted as conclusive.[79] The king's friends, however, had become more numerous, and acted under better discipline. Some held offices in the government or household, yet looked for instructions, not to ministers, but to the king. Men enjoying obscure, but [p.36] lucrative appointments, in the gift of the king himself, and other members of the royal family, voted at the bidding of the court. But the greater number of the king's friends were independent members of Parliament, whom various motives had attracted to his cause. Many were influenced by high notions of prerogative, – by loyalty, by confidence in the judgment and honesty of their sovereign, and personal attachment to his Majesty; and many by hopes of favour and advancement. They formed a distinct party; and their coherence was secured by the same causes which generally contribute to the formation of party ties.[80] But their principles and position were inconsistent with constitutional government. Their services to the king were no longer confined to counsel, or political intrigue: but were organised so as to influence the deliberations of Parliament. And their organisation for such a purpose, marked a further advance in the unconstitutional policy of the court.

The king continued personally to direct the measures of his ministers, more particularly in the disputes with the American colonies, which, in his opinion, involved the rights and honour of his crown.[81] He was resolutely opposed to the repeal of the Stamp Act, which ministers thought necessary for the conciliation of the colonies. He resisted this measure in council; but [p.37] finding ministers resolved to carry it, he opposed them in Parliament by the authority of his name, and by his personal influence over a considerable body of parliamentary adherents.[82] The king affected, indeed, to support his ministers, and to decline the use of his name in opposing them. “Lord Harcourt suggested, at a distance, that his Majesty might make his sentiments known, which might prevent the repeal of the act, if his ministers should push that measure. The king seemed averse to that, said he would never influence people in their parliamentary opinions, and that he had promised to support his ministers.”[83] But, however the king may have affected to deprecate the use of his name, it was unquestionably used by his friends;[84] and while he himself admitted the unconstitutional character of such a proceeding, it found a defender in Lord Mansfield. In discussing this matter with the king, his lordship argued “that, though it would be unconstitutional to endeavour by his Majesty's name to carry questions in Parliament, yet where the lawful rights of the king and Parliament were to be asserted and maintained, he thought the making his Majesty's opinion in support of those rights to be known, was fit and becoming.”[85] In order to counteract this secret influence, Lord Rockingham obtained the king's written consent to the passing of the bill.[86]

[p.38]

Ministers had to contend against another difficulty, which the tactics of the court had created. Not only were they opposed by independent members of the court party; but members holding office, – upon whose support ministers were justified in relying, – were encouraged to oppose them; and retained their offices, while voting in the ranks of the opposition. The king, who had punished with so much severity any opposition to measures which he approved, now upheld and protected those placemen, who opposed the ministerial measures to which he himself objected. In vain ministers remonstrated against their conduct: the king was ready with excuses and promises; but his chosen band were safe from the indignation of the government. Nor was their opposition confined to the repeal of the Stamp Act, – a subject on which they might have affected to entertain conscientious scruples: but it was vexatiously continued against the general measures of the administration.[87] Well might Mr. Burke term this “an opposition of a new and singular character, – an opposition of placemen and pensioners.”[88] Lord Rockingham protested against such a system while in office;[89] and after his dismissal, took occasion to observe to his Majesty, that “when he had the honour of being in his Majesty's service, the measures of administration were thwarted and obstructed by men in office, acting like a corps; that he flattered himself it was [p.39] not entirely with his majesty's inclination, and would assure him it was very detrimental to his service.”[90] This system, to use the words of Mr. Burke, tended “to produce neither the security of a free government, nor the energy of a monarchy that is absolute.”[91]

The king, meanwhile, had resolved to overthrow the Rockingham ministry, which was on every account distasteful to him. He disapproved their liberal policy: he was jealous of their powerful party, which he was bent on breaking up; and, above all, he resented their independence. He desired ministers to execute his will; and these men and their party were the obstacles to the cherished object of his ambition.

At length, in July, 1766, they were ungraciously dismissed;[92] and his Majesty now expected, from the hands of Mr. Pitt, an administration better suited to his own views and policy. Mr. Pitt's greatness had naturally pointed him out as the fittest man fur such a task; and there wore other circumstances which made him personally acceptable to the king. Haughty as was the demeanour of that distinguished man in the senate, and among his equals, his bearing in the royal presence was humble and obsequious. The truth of Mr. Burke s well-known sarcasm, that “the least peep into that closet intoxicates him, and will to the end of his life,”[93] was recognised by all his [p.40] contemporaries.[94] A statesman with at least the outward qualities of a courtier, was likely to give the king some repose, after his collisions with the two last ministries. He now undertook to form an administration, under the Duke of Grafton, with the office of privy seal, and a seat in the Upper House, as Earl of Chatham.

For another reason also. Lord Chatham was acceptable to the king. They agreed, though for different reasons, in the policy of breaking up party connections. This was now the settled object of the king, which he pursued with unceasing earnestness. In writing to Lord Chatham, July 29th, 1766,[95] he said, “I know the Earl of Chatham will zealously give his aid towards destroying all party distinctions, and restoring that subordination to government which can alone preserve that inestimable blessing, liberty, from degenerating into licentiousness.”[96] Again, December 2nd, 1766, he wrote to the Earl of Chatham: “To rout out the present method of parties banding together, can only be obtained by withstanding their unjust demands, as well as the engaging able [p.41] men, be their private connections where they will.”[97] And again, on the 25th June, 1767: “I am thoroughly resolved to encounter any difficulties rather than yield to faction.”[98]

By this policy the king hoped to further his cherished scheme of increasing his own personal influence. To overcome the Whig connection, was to bring into office the friends of Lord Bute, and the court party who were subservient to his views. Lord Chatham adopted the king's policy for a very different purpose. Though in outward observances a courtier, he was a constitutional statesman, opposed to government by prerogative, and court influence. His career had been due to his own genius: independent of party, and superior to it, he had trusted to his eloquence, his statesmanship, and popularity. And now, by breaking up parties, he hoped to rule over them all. His project, however, completely failed. Having offended and exasperated the Whigs, he found himself at the head of an administration composed of the king's friends, who thwarted him, and of other discordant elements, over which he had no control. He discovered, when it was too late, that the king had been more sagacious than himself, – and that while his own power and connections had crumbled away, the court party had obtained a dangerous ascendency. Parties had been broken up, and prerogative triumphed. The leaders of parties had been reduced to insignificance, while the king directed public affairs according to his own will, and upon [p.42] principles dangerous to public liberty. According to Burke, when Lord Chatham “had accomplished his scheme of administration, he was no longer minister.”[99] To repair the mischief which had been done, he afterwards sought an alliance with the party which, when in power, he had alienated from him. “Former little differences must be forgotten,” he said, “when the contest is pro aris et focis.”[100]

Meanwhile, other circumstances contributed to increase the influence of the king. Much of Lord Chatham's popularity had been sacrificed by the acceptance of a peerage; and his personal influence was diminished by his removal from the house of Commons, where he had been paramount. His holding so obscure a place as that of Privy Seal, further detracted from his weight as a minister. His melancholy prostration soon afterwards, increased the feebleness and disunion of the administration. Though his was its leading mind, for months he was incapacitated from attending to any business. He even refused an interview to the Duke of Grafton, the premier,[101] and to General Conway, though commissioned by the king to confer with him.[102] It is not surprising that the Duke of Grafton should complain of the languor under which “every branch of the administration laboured from his absence.”[103] Yet the king, writing to Lord Chatham, January 23rd, 1768, to dissuade him from [p.43] resigning the Privy Seal, said: “Though confined to your house, your name has been sufficient to enable my administration to proceed.”[104] At length, however, in October, 1768, completely broken down, he resigned his office, and withdrew from the administration.[105]

The absence of Lord Chatham, and the utter disorganisation of the ministry, left the king free to exercise his own influence, and to direct the policy of the country, without control. Had Lord Chatham been there, the ministry would have had a policy of its own: now it had none, and the Duke of Grafton and Lord North, – partly from indolence, and partly from facility, – consented to follow the stronger will of their sovereign.[106]

On his side, the king took advantage of the disruption of party ties, which he had taken pains to promote. In the absence of distinctive principles, and party leaders, members of Parliament were exposed to the direct influence of the crown. According to Horace Walpole, “everybody ran to court, and voted for whatever the court desired.”[107] The main object of the king in breaking up parties, had thus been secured.

On the resignation of the Duke of Grafton, the [p.44] king's ascendency in the councils of his ministers Lord further increased by the accession of Lord North to the chief direction of public affairs. That minister, by principle a Tory, and favourable to prerogative, – in character indolent and good-tempered, – and personally attached to the king, – yielded up his own opinions and judgment; and for years consented to be the passive instrument of the royal will.[108] The persecution of Wilkes, the straining of parliamentary privilege, and the coercion of America, were the disastrous fruits of the court policy. Throughout this administration, the king staked his personal credit upon the success of his measures; and regarded opposition to his minister as an act of disloyalty, and their defeat as an affront to himself.[109]

In 1770, Lord Chatham stated in Parliament, that since the king's accession there had been no original (i. e. independent) minister;[110] and examples abound of the king's personal participation in every political event of this period.

While the opposition were struggling to reverse the proceedings of the House of Commons against Wilkes, and Lord Chatham was about to move an address for dissolving [p.45] Parliament, the king's resentment knew no bounds. In conversations with General Conway, at this time, he declared he would abdicate his crown rather than comply with this address, “Yes,” said the king, laying his hand on his sword, “I will have recourse to this, sooner than yield to a dissolution of Parliament.”[111] And opinions have not been wanting, that the king was actually prepared to resist what he deemed an invasion of his prerogative, by military force.[112]

On the 26th February, 1772, while the Royal Marriage Bill was pending in the House of Lords, the king thus wrote to Lord North: “I expect every nerve to be strained to carry the bill. It is not a question relating to administration, but personally to myself: therefore I have a right to expect a hearty support from every one in my service, and I shall remember defaulters.”[113] Again, on the 14^th March, 1772, he wrote: “I wish a list could be prepared of those that went away, and of those that deserted to the minority (on division in the committee). That would be a rule for my conduct in the drawing-room to-morrow.[114] Again, in another letter, he said: “I am greatly incensed at the presumption of Charles Fox, in forcing you to vote with him last night.”[115] “I hope you will let him know that you are not [p.46] insensible of his conduct towards you.”[116] And the king's confidence in his own influence over the deliberations of Parliament, appears from another letter, on the 26th June, 1774, where he said, “I hope the crown will always be able, in either House of Parliament, to throw out a bill; but I shall never consent to use any expression which tends to establish, that at no time the right of the crown to dissent is to be used.”[117]

The king watched not only how members spoke and voted,[118] or whether they abstained from voting;”[119] but even if they were silent, when he had expected them to speak.[120] No “whipper-in” from the Treasury could have been more keen or full of expedients, in influencing the votes of members in critical divisions.[121] He was ready, also, to take advantage of the absence of opponents. Hearing that Mr. Fox was going to Paris, he wrote to Lord North, on the 15th November, 1776: “Bring as much forward as you can before the recess, as real business is never so well considered [p.47] as when the attention of the House is not taken up with noisy declamation.”[122]

Military officers were still exposed to marks of the king's displeasure. In 1773, Colonel Barré and Sir Hugh Williams, both refractory members of Parliament, were passed over in a brevet, or promotion; and Colonel Barré, in order to mark his sense of the injustice of this act of power, resigned his commission in the army.[123] The king, however, appears to have modified his opinions as to his right of depriving members of military commands, on account of their conduct in Parliament. Writing to Lord North, on the 5th March, 1779, he says: “I am strongly of opinion that the general officers, who through Parliament have got governments, should, on opposing, lose them. This is very different from removing them from their military commands.”[124] On the 9th March he writes “I wish to see the list of the defaulters, who have either employments, or military governments.”[125]

Not without many affronts, and much unpopularity, the king and his minister long triumphed over all opposition in Parliament;[126] but in 1778, the signal failure of ministry, their policy, the crisis in American affairs, and the impending war with France, obliged them to enter into negotiations with Lord Chatham, for the [p.48] admission of that statesman and some of the leaders of opposition into the ministry. The king needed their assistance, but was resolved not to adopt their policy. He would accept them as instruments of his own will, but not as responsible ministers. If their counsels should prevail, he would himself be humiliated and disgraced.

In a letter to Lord North, on the 15th March, 1778, the king says: “Honestly, I would rather lose the crown I now wear, than bear the ignominy of possessing it under their shackles.”[127] And, again, of the 17th of March, he writes: “I am still ready to accept any part of them that will come to the assistance of my present efficient ministers; but, whilst any ten men in the kingdom will stand by me, I will not give myself up to bondage. My dear Lord, I will rather risk my crown than do what I think personally disgraceful. It is impossible this nation should not stand by me. If they will not, they shall have another king, for I never will put my hand to what will make me miserable to the last hour of my life.”[128] Again, on the 18th, he writes: “Rather than be shackled by those desperate men (if the nation will not stand by me), I will rather see any form of government introduced into this island, and lose my crown, rather than wear it as a disgrace.”[129] The failure of these negotiations, followed by the death [p.49] of Lord Chatham, left unchanged the unfortunate administration of Lord North.

Overtures, indeed, were made to the Whig leaders, to join a new ministry under Lord Weymouth, which were, perhaps unwisely, declined;[130] and henceforth the king was resolved to admit none to his councils without exacting a pledge of compliance with his wishes. Thus, on the 4th February, 1779, writing to Lord North, he says: “You may now sound Lord Howe; but, before I name him to preside at the Admiralty Board, I must expect an explicit declaration that he will zealously concur in prosecuting the war in all the quarters of the globe.”[131] Again, on the 22nd June, 1779, he writes: “Before I will hear of any man's readiness to come into office, I will expect to see it signed under his own hand, that he is resolved to keep the empire entire, and that no troops shall consequently be withdrawn from thence (i. e. America), nor independence ever allowed.”[132] It was not without reason that this deplorable contest was called the king's war.[133]

At this time it was openly avowed in the House of Commons by Lord George Germaine, that the king was his own minister; and Mr. Fox lamented “that his Majesty was his own unadvised minister.”[134] Nor was it unnatural that the king should expect [p.50] such submission from other statesmen, when his first minister was carrying out a policy of which he disapproved, but wanted resolution to resist”[135] – and when Parliament had hitherto supported his illomened measures. Lord North did not conceal his own views concerning the continuance of the American war. In announcing to the king the resignation of Lord Gower, who was of opinion that the contest “must end in ruin to his Majesty and the country,” he said: “in the argument Lord North had certainly one disadvantage, which is that he held in his heart, and has held for three years past, the same opinion as Lord Grower.”[136] Yet the minister submitted to the stronger will of his royal master.

Again, however, the king was reduced to treat with the opposition; but was not less resolute in his determination that no change of ministers should affect the policy of his measures. On the 3rd December, 1779, he was prevailed upon to give Lord Thurlow authority to open a negotiation with the leaders of the opposition; and expressed his willingness “to admit into his confidence and service any men of public spirit and talents, who will join with part of the present ministry in forming one on a more enlarged scale, provided it be understood that every means are to be employed to keep the empire entire, to prosecute the present just and unprovoked war in all its branches, with the utmost vigour, and that his Majesty's past measures be treated with proper [p.51] respect.”[137] Finding the compliance of independent statesmen less ready than he desired, he writes to Lord Thurlow, on the 18th December, “From the cold disdain with which I am treated, it is evident to me what treatment I am to expect from the opposition, if I was to call them into my service. To obtain their support, I must deliver up my person, my principles, and my dominions into their hands.”[138] In other words, the king dreaded the admission of any ministers to his councils, who claimed an independent judgment upon the policy for which they would become responsible.

In the meantime, the increasing influence of the crown, and the active personal exercise of its prerogatives, were attracting: the attention of the people and of Parliament. In the debate on the address at the opening of Parliament, on the 25th November, 1779, Mr. Fox said: “He saw very early indeed, in the present reign, the plan of government which had been laid down, and had since been invariably pursued in every department. It was not the mere rumour of the streets that the king was his own minister: the fatal truth was evident, and had made itself evident in every circumstance of the war carried on against America and the West Indies.”[139] This was denied by ministers;[140] but evidence, not accessible to [p.52] contemporaries, has since made his statement indisputable.

Early in the following year, numerous public meetings were held, associations formed, and petitions presented in favour of economic reforms; and complaining of the undue influence of the crown, and of the patronage and corruption by which it was maintained.[141] It was for the redress of these grievances that Mr. Burke offered his celebrated scheme of economical reform. He confessed that the main object of this scheme was “the reduction of that corrupt influence, which is itself the perennial spring of all prodigality and of all disorder; which loads us more than millions of debt; which takes away vigour from our arms, wisdom from our councils, and every shadow of authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our constitution.”[142]

On the 6th April, Mr. Dunning moved resolutions, in a committee of the whole House, founded upon these petitions. The first, which is memorable in political history, affirmed “that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”[143] The Lord Advocate, Mr. Dundas, endeavoured to diminish the force of this resolution by the prefatory words, “that it is necessary to declare;” but Mr. Fox, on behalf of the opposition, at once assented to this amendment, and the resolution was carried by a majority of eighteen. A second resolution was agreed to, without a division, affirming the right of the House [p.53] to correct abuses in the civil list expenditure, and every other branch of the public revenue; and also a third, affirming “that it is the duty of this House to provide, as far as may be, an immediate and effectual redress of the abuses complained of in the petitions presented to this House.” The opposition, finding themselves in a majority, pushed forward their success. They would consent to no delay; and these resolutions were immediately reported and agreed to by the House. This debate was signalised by the opposition speech of Sir Fletcher Norton, the Speaker, who bore his personal testimony to the increased and increasing influence of the crown.[144] The king, writing to Lord North, on the 11th April, concerning these obnoxious resolutions, said: “I wish I did not feel at whom they were personally levelled.”[145]

The same matters were also debated, in this session, in the House of Lords. The debate on the Earl of Shelburne's motion, of the 8th February, for an inquiry into the public expenditure, brought out further testimonies to the influence of the crown. Of these the most remarkable was given by the Marquess of Rockingham; who asserted that since the accession of the king, there had been “a fixed determination to govern this country under the forms of law, through the influence of the crown.” Everything within and without, whether in cabinet, Parliament, or elsewhere, carried about it the most [p.54] unequivocal marks of such a system: the whole economy of executive government, in all its branches, proclaimed it, whether professional, deliberative, or official. The supporters of it in books, pamphlets, and newspapers, avowed it, and defended it without reserve. It was early in the present reign promulged as a court axiom, “that the power and influence of the crown alone was sufficient to support any set of men his Majesty might think proper to call to his councils.” The fact bore evidence of its truth: for through the influence of the crown, majorities had been procured to support any men or any measures, which an administration, thus constituted, thought proper to dictate.”[146]

This very motion provoked the exercise of prerogative, in an arbitrary and offensive form, in order to influence the votes of peers, and to intimidate opponents. The Marquess of Carmarthen and the Earl of Pembroke had resigned their offices in the household, in order to give an independent vote. Before the former had voted, he received notice that he was dismissed from the lord-lieutenancy of the East Riding of the county of York;[147] and soon after the latter had recorded his vote, he was dismissed from the Lord-lieutenancy of Wiltshire, – an office which had been held by his family, at different times, for centuries.[148] This flagrant exercise of prerogative could not escape the [p.55] notice of Parliament; and on the 6th March, Lord Shelburne moved an address praying the king to acquaint the House whether he had been advised, and by whom, to dismiss these peers “from their employments, for their conduct in Parliament.” The motion was negatived by a large majority: but the unconstitutional acts of the king were strongly condemned in debate; and again animadversions were made upon the influence of the crown, more especially in the administration of the army and militia.[149]

On the meeting of Parliament, on the 27^th November, 1781, amendments were moved in both Houses, in answer to the king's speech, when strong opinions were expressed regarding the influence of the crown, and the irregular and irresponsible system under which the government of the country was conducted. The Duke of Richmond said, “that the country was governed by clerks, – each minister confining himself to his own office, – and, consequently, instead of responsibility, union of opinion, and concerted measures, nothing was displayed but dissension, weakness, and corruption.” The “interior cabinet,” he declared, had been the ruin of this country.[150] The Marquess of Rockingham described the system of government pursued since the commencement of the reign as “a prospective system, – a system of favouritism and secret influence.”[151] Mr. Fox imputed all the defeats and disasters of the American war to the influence of the crown.[152]

[p.56]

The king was never diverted, by defeat and disaster, from his resolution to maintain the war with America: but the House of Commons was now determined upon peace; and a struggle ensued which was to decide the fate of the minister, and to overcome, by the power of Parliament, the stubborn will of the king. On the 22nd February, 1782, General Conway moved an address deprecating the continuance of the war, but was defeated by a majority of one.[153] On the 27th, he proposed another address with the same object. Lord North begged for a short respite: but an adjournment being refused by a majority of nineteen, the motion was agreed to without a division.[154]

On the receipt of the king's answer. General Conway moved a resolution that “the House will consider as enemies to the king and country all who shall advise, or by any means attempt, the further prosecution of offensive war, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force.”[155] In reply to this proposal, Lord North astonished the House by announcing, – not that he proposed to resign on the reversal of the policy, to which he was pledged, – but that he was prepared to give effect to the instructions of the House! Mr. Fox repudiated the principle of a minister remaining in office, to carry out the policy of his opponents, against his own judgment; and General Conway's resolution was agreed to. Lord North, however, persevered with his propositions for peace, and declared his [p.57] determination to retain office until the king should command him to resign, or the House should point out to him, in the clearest manner, the propriety of withdrawing.[156] No time was lost in pressing him with the latter alternative. On the 8th March, a motion of Lord John Cavendish, charging all the misfortunes of the war upon the incompetency of the ministers, was lost by a majority of ten.[157] On the 15th, Sir J. Rous moved that “the House could no longer repose confidence in the present ministers,” and his motion was negatived by a majority of nine.[158] On the 20th the assault was about to be repeated, when Lord North announced his resignation.[159]

The king had watched this struggle with great anxiety, as one personal to himself. Writing to Lord North on the 17th March, after the motion of Sir J. Rous, he said: “I am resolved not to throw myself into the hands of the opposition at all events; and shall certainly, if things go as they seem to tend, know what my conscience as well as honour dictates, as the only way left for me.”[160] He even desired the royal yacht to be prepared, and talked as if nothing were now left for him but to retire to Hanover.[161] But it had become impossible to retain any longer in his service that “confidential minister,” whom he had “always [p.58] treated more as his friend than minister.”[162] By the earnest solicitations of the king,[163] Lord North had been induced to retain office against his own wishes: he had persisted in a policy of which he disapproved; and when forced to abandon it, he still held his ground, in order to protect the king from the intrusion of those whom his Majesty regarded as his personal enemies.[164] He was now fairly driven from his post, and the king, appreciating the personal devotion of his minister, rewarded his zeal and fidelity with a munificent present from the privy purse.[165]

The king's correspondence with Lord North[166] gives us a remarkable insight into the relations of his Majesty with that minister, and with the government of the country. Not only did he direct the minister in all important matters of foreign and domestic policy, but he instructed him as to the management of debates in Parliament, suggested what motions should be made [p.59] or opposed, and how measures should be carried. He reserved to himself all the patronage, – he arranged the entire cast of the administration, – settled the relative places and pretensions of ministers of state, of law officers, and members of his household, – nominated and promoted the English and Scotch judges, – appointed and translated bishops, nominated deans, and dispensed other preferments in the church.[167] He disposed of military governments, regiments, and commissions; and himself ordered the marching of troops.[168] He gave or refused titles, honours, and pensions.[169] All his directions were peremptory: Louis the Great himself could not have been more royal: – he enjoyed the consciousness of power, and felt himself “every inch a king.”

But what had been the result of twenty years of kingcraft? Whenever the king's personal influence had been the greatest, there had been the fiercest turbulence and discontent among the people, the most signal failures in the measures of the government, and the heaviest disasters to the state. Of all the evil days of England during this king's long reign, the worst are recollected in the ministries of Lord Bute, Mr. Grenville, the Duke of [p.60] Grafton, and Lord North. Nor had the royal will, – however potential with ministers, – prevailed in the government of the country. He had been thwarted and humbled by his parliaments, and insulted by demagogues: parliamentary privilege, which he had sought to uphold as boldly as his own prerogative, had been defied and overcome by Wilkes and the printers: the liberty of the press, which he would have restrained, had been provoked into licentiousness; and his kingdom had been shorn of some of its fairest provinces.[170]

On the retirement of Lord North, the king submitted, with a bad grace, to the Rockingham administration. He found places, indeed, for his own friends, but the policy of the cabinet was as distasteful to him as were the persons of some of the statesmen of whom it was composed. Its first principle was the concession of independence to America, which he had so long resisted: its second was the reduction of the influence of the crown, by the abolition of offices, the exclusion of contractors from Parliament, and the disfranchisement of revenue officers.[171] Shortly after its formation, Mr. Fox, writing to Mr. Fitzpatrick,[172] said: “provided we can stay in long enough to give a good stout blow to the influence of the crown, I do not think it much signifies how soon we go out after.”[173] This ministry was constituted of materials [p.61] not likely to unite, – of men who had supported the late ministry, and of the leaders of the parliamentary opposition, – or, as Mr. Fox expressed it, “it consisted of two parts, one belonging to the king, the other to the public”[174] Such men could not be expected to act cordially together: but they aimed their blow at the influence of the crown, by passing the contractors' bill, the revenue officers' bill, and a bill for the reduction of offices.[175] They also suffered the former policy of the court to be stigmatised, by expunging from the journals of the House of Commons, the obnoxious resolutions which had affirmed the disability of Wilkes. A ministry promoting such measures as these, was naturally viewed with distrust and ill-will by the court. So hard was the struggle between them, that the surly chancellor. Lord Thurlow, – who had retained his office by the express desire of the king, and voted against all the measures of the government, – affirmed that Lord Rockingham was “bringing things to a pass where either his head or the king's must go, in order to settle which of them is to govern the country.”[176] The king was described by his Tory friends as a prisoner in the hands of his ministers, and represented in the caricatures of the day, as being put in fetters by his gaolers.[177] In the same spirit, ministers were termed the “Regency,” [p.62] as if they had assumed to exercise the royal authority. In a few months, however, this ministry, was on the point of breaking up, in consequence of differences of opinion and personal jealousies, when the death of Lord Rockingham dissolved it.

Mr. Fox. and his friends retired, and Lord Shelburne, who had represented the king in the late Cabinet, was placed at the head of the new administration; while Mr. William Pitt now first entered office, though little more than twenty-three years of age, as Chancellor of the Exchequer.[178] The secession of the popular party restored the king's confidence in his ministers, who now attempted to govern by his influence, and to maintain their position against a formidable combination of parties. Horace Walpole represents Lord Shelburne as “trusting to maintain himself entirely by the king;”[179] and such was the state of parties that, in truth, he had little else to rely upon. In avowing this influence, he artfully defended it, in the spirit of the king's friends, by retorting upon the great Whig families. He would never consent, he said, “that the king of England should be a king of the Mahrattas; for among the Mahrattas the custom is, it seems, for a certain number of great lords to elect a Peishwah, who is thus the creature of the aristocracy, and is vested with the plenitude of power, while their king is, in fact, nothing more than a royal pageant.”[180]

[p.63]

By breaking up parties, the king had hoped to secure his independence and to enlarge his own influence; but now he was startled by a result which he had not anticipated. “Divide et impera” had been his maxim, and to a certain extent it had succeeded. Separation of parties had enfeebled their opposition to his government; but now their sudden combination overthrew it. When the preliminary articles of peace with America were laid before Parliament, the parties of Lord North and Mr. Fox, – so long opposed to each other, and whose political hostility had been embittered by the most acrimonious disputes, – formed a “Coalition,” and outvoted the government, in the House of Commons.[181] Overborne by numbers, the minister resigned; and the king alone confronted this powerful coalition. The struggle which ensued was one of the most critical in our modem constitutional history. The royal prerogatives on the one side, and the powers of Parliament on the other, were more strained than at any time since the Revolution. But the issue illustrated the paramount influence of the crown.

The leaders of the coalition naturally expected to succeed to power; but the king was resolved to resist their pretensions. He sought Mr. Pitt's assistance to form a government; and with such a minister, would have braved the united forces of the opposition. But that sagacious statesman, [p.64] though not yet twenty-four years of age,[182] had taken an accurate survey of the state of parties, and of public opinion; and seeing that it was not yet the time for putting himself in the front of the battle, he resisted the solicitations of his Majesty, and the advice of his friends, in order to await a more fitting opportunity of serving his sovereign.[183] In vain did the king endeavour once more to disunite the coalition, by making separate proposals to Lord North and the Duke of Portland. The new confederacy was not to be shaken, – and the king found himself at its mercy. It was long, however, before he would submit. He wrote to Lord Weymouth 'to desire his support against his new tyrants;”[184] and “told the Lord Advocate that sooner than yield he would go to Hanover, and had even prevailed upon the queen to consent.” From this resolution he was probably dissuaded by the rough counsels of Lord Thurlow. “Your Majesty may go,” said he, “nothing is more easy: but you may not find it so easy to return, when your Majesty becomes tired of staying there.” It was not until the country had been for seventeen days without a government, that the king agreed to Lord North's scheme of a coalition ministry. But further difficulties were raised; and at length the House of Commons interposed. After several debates, – in one of which Mr. Fox accused the king's secret friends of breaking off the negotiation, –the House [p.65] addressed his Majesty to form “an administration entitled to the confidence of his people.” The address was graciously answered; but still no ministry was formed. Again the king pressed Mr. Pitt to become his premier, who again firmly and finally refused.[185] At length, after an extraordinary interval of thirty-seven days, from the 24th February to the 2nd April, the coalition ministry was completed under the Duke of Portland.[186]

Such are the vicissitudes of political life, that Lord North, who for years had been the compliant and obsequious minister of the king, was now forcing his way into office, in alliance with Mr. Fox, the king's most dreaded opponent, and lately his own. While the king was yet holding them at bay, the new friends were concerting measures for restraining his future influence. As no one had submitted to that influence so readily as Lord North, we cannot intrude into their secret conferences without a smile. Mr. Fox insisted that the king should not be suffered to be his own minister, to which Lord North replied: “If you mean there should not be a government by departments, I agree with you. I think it a very bad system. There should be one man, or [p.66] a cabinet, to govern the whole, and direct every measure. Government by departments was not brought in by me. I found it so, and had not the vigour and resolution to put an end to it. The king ought to be treated with all sort of respect and attention: but the appearance of power is all that a king of this country can have. Though the government in my time was a government by departments, the whole was done by the ministers, except in a few instances.”[187]

But whatever were the views of ministers regarding the king's future authority, he himself had no intention of submitting to them. He did not attempt to disguise his repugnance to the ministry which had been forced upon him: but. avowing that he yielded to compulsion, gave them to understand that they need expect no support from him, and that he would not create any British peers upon their recommendation. He told Lord Temple “that to such a ministry he never would give his confidence, and that he would take the first moment for dismissing them.”[188] The coalition had not found favour in the country; and no pains were spared, by the king's friends, to increase its unpopularity. Meanwhile the king watched all the proceedings of his ministers with jealousy, thwarted them whenever he could, criticized their policy, and openly assumed an attitude of opposition.[189] Thus, writing to Mr. Fox, who, as [p.67] secretary of state, was negotiating the peace, in August, 1783, he said: “I cannot say that I am so surprised at France not putting the last strokes to the definitive treaty, as soon as we may wish, as our having totally disarmed, in addition to the extreme anxiety shown for peace, during the whole period that has ensued, since the end of February, 1782, certainly makes her feel that she can have no reason to apprehend any evil from so slighting a proceeding.”[190]

An opportunity soon arose for more active hostility. Mr. Fox's India Bill had been brought into the House of Commons; and, m spite of the most strenuous opposition, was being rapidly passed by large majorities. It was denounced as unconstitutional, and as an invasion of the prerogatives of the crown: but no means had been found to stay its progress. The king now concerted with his friends a bold and unscrupulous plan for defeating the bill, and overthrowing his ministers. Instead of requiring the withdrawal or amendment of the bill, – as he was entitled to do, – his name was to be used, and an active canvass undertaken by his authority, against the measure of his own ministers. Though this plan was agreed upon eight days before the bill reached the House of Lords, it was cautiously concealed. To arrest the progress of the bill in the Commons was hopeless; und the interference of the crown, in that House, would have excited dangerous resentment. The [p.68] blow was therefore to be struck in the other House, where it would have greater weight, and be attended with less danger.[191] Lord Temple, – who had suggested this plan, in concert with Lord Thurlow, and to whom its execution was entrusted, – having had an audience with his Majesty, declared himself authorised to protest against the bill in the king's name. And in order to leave no doubt as to his commission, the following words were written upon a card: –

“His Majesty allows Earl Temple to say that whoever voted for the India Bill, was not only not his friend, but would be considered by him as an enemy; and if these words were not strong enough. Earl Temple might use whatever words he might deem stronger, and more to the purpose.”[192]

With these credentials, Lord Temple proceeded to canvass the peers, – with what success was soon apparent. On the first reading, supported by Lord Thurlow and the Duke of Richmond, he gave the signal of attack. The peers assumed a threatening attitude,[193] and on the 15th December, placed the ministers in a minority, on a question of adjournment. Little secrecy or reserve was maintained by the king's friends, who took care to proclaim his Majesty's wishes. The use made of the king's name was noticed by the Duke of Portland, the Duke of [p.69] Richmond, and Earl Fitzwilliam: and was not denied by Lord Temple.[194]

Mr. Fitzpatrick, writing to Lord Ossory, on the loth December, said: “the proxies of the king's friends are arrived against the bill. The public is full of alarm and astonishment at the treachery, as well as the imprudence, of this unconstitutional interference. Nobody guesses what will be the consequences of a conduct that is generally compared to that of Charles I., in 1641.”[195]

Before the success of the court measures was complete, the Commons endeavoured to arrest them. On the 17th December, Mr. Baker, after denouncing secret advice to the crown, against its responsible ministers, and the use of the king's name, moved a resolution, “that it is now necessary to declare, that to report any opinion, or pretended opinion, of his Majesty, upon any bill, or other proceeding, depending in either House of Parliament, with a view to influence the votes of the members, is a high crime and misdemeanour, derogatory to the honour of the crown, – a breach of the fundamental privileges of Parliament, and subversive of the constitution.”[196]

In vain did Mr. Pitt contend that the House could not deal with rumours, and that the hereditary councillors of the crown had always a right to give advice to their sovereign. Mr. Fox replied in a [p.70] masterly speech, full of constitutional arguments, and eloquent with indignant remonstrances.[197] The resolution was voted by a majority of seventy-three; and the House resolved to go into committee on the state of the nation, on the following Monday. But this was not enough. It was evident that the king had determined upon a change of ministers; and lest he should also attempt to overthrow the obnoxious majority by a sudden dissolution, the House, on the motion of Mr. Erskine, agreed to a resolution affirming the necessity of considering a suitable remedy for abuses in the government of the British dominions in the East Indies; and declaring “that this House will consider as an enemy to his country, any person who shall presume to advise his Majesty to prevent, or in any manner interrupt, the discharge of this important duty.”[198] The Commons had a right to protest against the irregular acts of the king's secret advisers: but the position assumed by ministers was indeed anomalous. It was not for them to level censures against the king himself. They should either have impeached or censured Lord Temple, or, protesting against the abuse of his Majesty's name, should have tendered their own resignation.[199]

[p.71]

But the strange spectacle was here exhibited, of a king; plotting against his own ministers, – of the ministers inveighing against the conduct of their royal master, – of the House of Commons supporting them, and condemning the king, – and of the king defying at once his ministers and the House of Commons, and trusting to his influence with the Peers. The king's tactics prevailed. On the very day on which the Commons agreed to these strong remonstrances against his interference, it was crowned with complete success. The bill was rejected by the House of Lords,[200] and the next day the king followed up his advantage, by at once dismissing his ministers.[201] To make this dismissal as contemptuous as possible, he sent a message to Lord North, and Mr. Fox, commanding them to return their seals by their under-secretaries, as an audience would be disagreeable to his Majesty.[202] Earl Temple, who had done the king this service, was entrusted with the seals for the purpose of formally dismissing the other ministers: the man who had been the king's chief agent in defeating them, was chosen to offer them this last affront.

But the battle was not yet won. The king had struck down his ministers, though supported by a vast majority of the House of Commons: he had now to support a minister of his own [p.72] choice against that majority, and to overcome it. Mr. Pitt no longer hesitated to take the post of trust and dangler, -which the king at once conferred upon him. His time had now come; and he resolved to give battle to an angry majority, – under leaders of great talents and experience, – smarting under defeat, and full of resentment at the unconstitutional means by which they had been overthrown. He accepted the offices of first lord of the Treasury and chancellor of the Exchequer; and the king's sturdy friend, Lord Thurlow, was reinstated as lord chancellor. Mr. Pitt had also relied upon the assistance of Earl Temple,[203] -whose zeal in the king's service was much needed in such a crisis; but that nobleman resigned the seals a few days after he had received them, assigning as his reason a desire to be free to answer any charges against him, arising out of his recent conduct.[204]

The contest which the youthful premier had now to conduct, was the most arduous that had ever devolved upon any minister, since the accession of the House of Hanover. So overpowering was the majority against him, that there seemed scarcely a hope of offering it an effectual resistance. His opponents were so confident of success, that when a new writ was moved for Appleby, on his acceptance of office, the motion was received with shouts of derisive laughter.[205] And while the presumption of [p.73] the boy minister was ridiculed,[206] the strongest measures were immediately taken to deprive him of his authority, and to intimidate the court, whose policy he supported. Many of Mr. Pitt's advisers, despairing of his prospects with the present Parliament, counselled an immediate dissolution:[207] but the same consummate judgment and foresight which, a few months earlier, had induced him to decline office, because the time was not yet ripe for action, now led him to the conviction that he must convert public opinion to his side, before he appealed to the people. Though standing alone, – without the aid of a single cabinet minister, in the House of Commons,[208] – he resolved, under every disadvantage, to meet the assaults of his opponents on their own ground; and his talents, his courage, and resources ultimately won a signal victory.

Secure of their present majority, the first object of the opposition was to prevent a dissolution which they believed to be impending. They could withhold the supplies, and press the king with representations against his ministers. His Majesty had the unquestioned prerogatives of appointing his own constitutional advisers and dissolving Parliament. The last appeal of both was to the people: and this appeal the Commons sought to [p.74] deny the king. The day after the dismissal of the late ministers, the opposition insisted on the postponement of the third reading of the Land-tax bill for two days, in order, as Mr. Fox avowed, that it might not “go out of their hands until they should have taken such measures as would guard against the evils which might be expected from a dissolution.”[209] On the 22nd December, the House went into committee on the state of the nation, when Mr. Erskine moved an address to the crown representing “that alarming rumours of an intended dissolution of Parliament have gone forth:” that “inconveniences and dangers” were “likely to follow from a prorogation or dissolution of the Parliament, in the present arduous and critical conjunction of affairs;” and beseeching his Majesty “to suffer his faithful Commons to proceed on the business of the session, the furtherance of which is so essentially necessary to the prosperity of the public; and that his Majesty will be graciously pleased to hearken to the advice of his faithful Commons, and not to the secret advices of particular persons, who may have private interests of their own, separate from the true interests of his Majesty and his people.”[210] Notwithstanding assurances that Mr. Pitt had no intention of advising a dissolution, and would not consent to it if advised by others, the address was agreed to, and presented to the king by the whole House. In his answer the king assured them that he would “not interrupt [p.75] their meeting by any exercise of his prerogative, either of prorogation or dissolution.”[211] This assurance, it was observed, merely referred to the meeting of Parliament after the Christmas recess, and did not remove the apprehensions of the opposition. On the 24th of December, a resolution was agreed to, that the Treasury ought not to consent to the acceptance of any more bills from India, until it should appear to the House that there were sufficient means to meet them.[212]

These strong measures had been taken in Mr. Pitt's absence; and on his return to the House, after Christmas, the opposition resumed their offensive attitude. Mr. Fox went so far as to refuse to allow Mr. Pitt to deliver a message from the king; and being in possession of the House, at once moved the order of the day for the committee on the state of the nation. In the debate which ensued, the opposition attempted to extort a promise that Parliament should not be dissolved: but Mr. Pitt said he would not “presume to compromise the royal prerogative, or bargain it away in the House of Commons.”[213] This debate was signalized by the declaration of General Ross that he had been sent for by a lord of the Bedchamber, and told that if he voted against the new administration on the 12th January, he would be considered as an enemy to the king.[214] Unable to obtain any pledge from the minister, the opposition at once addressed themselves [p.76] to devise effectual obstacles to an early dissolution. The House having resolved itself into the committee on the state of the nation, at half past two in the Resolution morning, Mr. Fox immediately moved a resolution, which was agreed to without a division, declaring it to be a high crime and misdemeanour to issue, after a dissolution or prorogation, any money not appropriated by Parliament.[215] He then moved for “accounts of the several sums of money issued, or ordered to be issued, from the 19th December, 1783, to the 14^th January, 1784,” for “services voted in the present session, but not appropriated by any act of Parliament to such services.” He also proposed to add, “that no moneys should be issued for any public service, till that return was made, nor for three days afterwards;” but withdrew this motion, on being assured that it would be attended with inconvenience. He further obtained the postponement of the Mutiny Bill until the 23rd February, which still left time for its passing before the expiration of the annual Mutiny Act.

These resolutions were followed by another, proposed by the Earl of Surrey, “that in the present situation of his Majesty s dominions, it is peculiarly necessary that there should be an administration that has the confidence of this House [p.77] and the public.” This being carried, he proceeded to another, “that the late changes in his Majesty's councils were immediately preceded by dangerous and universal reports: that his Majesty s sacred name had been unconstitutionally abused to affect the deliberations of Parliament; and that the appointments made were accompanied by circumstances new and extraordinary, and such as do not conciliate or engage the confidence of this House.” All these resolutions were reported immediately and agreed to; and the House did not adjourn until half-past seven in the morning.[216]

Two days afterwards the attack was renewed. A resolution was carried in the committee, “that the continuance of the present ministers in trusts of the highest importance and responsibility, is contrary to constitutional principles, and injurious to the interests of his Majesty and his people.”[217] The opposition accused the minister of reviving the distracted times before the Revolution, when the House of Commons was generally at variance with the crown: but he listened to their remonstrances with indifference. He brought in his India Bill: it was thrown out after the second reading. Again, he was goaded to declare his intentions concerning a dissolution; but to the indignation of his opponents, he maintained silence.[218] At length, on the 26^th [p.78] January, he declared that, in the present situation of affairs, he should not advise a dissolution. At the same time, he said that the appointment and removal of ministers did not rest with the House of Commons; and that as his resignation would be injurious to the public service, he still intended to retain office. The House passed a resolution affirming that they relied upon the king's assurances, that the consideration of the affairs of the East India Company should not be interrupted by a prorogation or dissolution.

Meanwhile, several influential members were endeavouring to put an end to this hazardous conflict, by effecting an union of parties. With this view, a meeting was held at the St. Alban's Tavern; and even the king consented to a negotiation for the reconstruction of the ministry upon a wide basis.[219] To further this scheme of union, General Grosvenor moved a resolution: “that the present arduous and critical situation of public affairs requires the exertion of a firm, efficient, extended, united administration, entitled to the confidence of the people, and such as may have a tendency to put an end to the unfortunate divisions and distractions of this country.”[220] This being carried, was followed by another, proposed by Mr. Coke of Norfolk: that the continuance of the present ministers in their offices, is an obstacle to the formation of such an administration as may [p.79] enjoy the confidence of this House.” This, too, was agreed to, on a division.[221] It pointed too distinctly at the retirement of Mr. Pitt himself, to favour any compromise. As these resolutions had no more effect than previous votes, in shaking the firmness of the minister, they were ordered, on the following day, to be laid before his Majesty.

The House of Lords now came to the aid of the king and his minister. On the 4th February, they agreed to two resolutions proposed by the Earl of Effingham. The first, referring to the vote of the Commons concerning the acceptance of bills from India, affirmed, “that an attempt in any one branch of the legislature to suspend the execution of law by separately assuming to itself the direction of a discretionary power, which, by an act of Parliament, is vested in any body of men, to be exercised as they shall judge expedient, is unconstitutional.” The second was that “the undoubted authority of appointing to the great offices of executive government is solely vested in his Majesty; and that this House has every reason to place the firmest reliance on his Majesty's wisdom, in the exercise of this prerogative.” They were followed by an address to the king, assuring him of their Lordships' support in the exercise of his undoubted prerogative, and of their reliance upon his wisdom in the choice of his ministers. To this address he returned an answer, “that he had no object in the choice of ministers, but to call into his [p.80] service men the most deserving of the confidence of his Parliament, and of the public in general.”[222]

To these proceedings the Commons replied by inspecting the Lords’ Journal for their obnoxious resolutions, – by searching for precedents of the usage of Parliament, – and, finally, by declaring that the House had not assumed to suspend the execution of law; – and that they had a right to declare their opinion respecting the exercise of every discretionary power, and particularly with reference to public money. They justified their previous votes, and asserted their determination to maintain their own privileges, while they avoided any encroachment on the rights of either of the other branches of the legislature.

In the meantime, no answer had been returned to the resolutions which the Commons had laid before the king. When this was noticed, Mr. Pitt was silent;[223] and at length, on the 10th February, on the report of the ordnance estimates, Mr. Fox said that the House could not vote supplies, until they knew what answer they were to receive. Mr. Pitt engaged that the House should be informed what line of conduct his Majesty intended to pursue; and the report, instead of being agreed to, was recommitted. On the 18th, Mr. Pitt acquainted the House “that his Majesty had not yet, in compliance with the resolutions of the House, thought proper to dismiss his present ministers; and that His Majesty's ministers had not [p.81] resigned.” This announcement was regarded as a defiance of the House of Commons, and again the supplies were postponed for two days: though the leaders of the opposition disclaimed all intention of refusing them.[224] On the 20th, another resolution and an address were voted,[225] expressing reliance upon the royal wisdom to remove “any obstacle to the formation of such an administration as the House has declared to be requisite.” The address was presented by the whole House. The king replied, that he was anxious for a firm and united administration: but that no charge had been suggested against his present ministers: that numbers of his subjects had expressed satisfaction at the late changes in his councils; and that the Commons could not expect the executive offices to be vacated, until such a plan of union as they had pointed out, could be carried into effect.[226] This answer was appointed to be considered on the 1st March, to which day the House adjourned, without entering upon any other business; and thus again the supplies were postponed. On the motion of Mr. Fox, the House then presented a further address to the king, submitting “that the continuance of an administration which does not possess the confidence of the representatives of the people, must be injurious to the public service,” and praying for its removal. Mr. Fox maintained it to be without [p.82] precedent for a ministry to hold office, in defiance of the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt retorted that the history of this country afforded no example of a ministry being called upon to retire untried, and without a cause. The king, in his reply, took up the same ground, and affirming that no charge, complaint, or specific objection had yet been made against any of his ministers, again declined to dismiss them. And thus stood the king and his ministers on one side, and the House of Commons on the other, arrayed in hostile attitude, – each party standing firmly on its constitutional rights: the one active and offensive, – the other patiently waiting to strike a decisive blow.

The Mutiny Bill was now postponed for some days, as its passing was expected to be the signal for an immediate dissolution; and one more effort was made to drive the ministers from office. On the 8th March, “a representation” to the king was moved by Mr. Fox,[227] to testify the surprise and affliction of the House on receiving his Majesty's answer to their last address, – reiterating all their previous statements, – comparing the conduct and principles of his advisers with those which characterized the unfortunate reigns of the Stuarts, – justifying the withholding of their confidence from ministers without preferring any charge, as it was their removal and not their punishment which was sought, – and taking credit to themselves for their [p.83] forbearance, in not withholding the supplies.[228] This was the last struggle of the opposition. When their encounters with the ministry began, their majority was nearly two to one. This great disproportion soon diminished, though it was still, for a time, considerable. On the 12^th January, their majority was fifty-four; on the 20^th February, it was reduced to twenty. On the 1^st March it fell to twelve: on the 5th it was only nine; and now, on this last occasion, it dwindled to one. The parliamentary contest was at an end. The king and his ministers had triumphed, and were about to appeal from Parliament to the people.

The Mutiny Bill was passed:[229] large supplies were voted rapidly, but not appropriated: on the 24^th March Parliament was prorogued, and on the following day dissolved.

While this contest was being carried on in Parliament, the contending parties were not idle out of doors. The king, who rushed into it with so much boldness, had not been prepared for the alarming demonstrations of Parliament. If the minister of his choice had now been driven from power, he would have been prostrate before the coalition. This danger was at first imminent; and the king awaited it with dismay. Defeat in such a contest would have been humiliating; and disgraceful. Believing that he could be “no longer of utility to this country, nor could with honour continue in this [p.84] island,” he repeated his threats of retiring to Hanover, rather than submit to what he deemed the destruction of his kingly power.[230] From such extremities, however, he was relieved by the declining numbers of his opponents, and the increasing influence and popularity of his own cause. The coalition, though powerful in Parliament, by means of a combination of parties, had never been popular in the country. While in power they had been exposed to continual obloquy, which was redoubled after their dismissal. The new ministers and the court party, taking advantage of this feeling, represented Mr. Fox's India Bill as an audacious attempt to interfere with the prerogatives of the crown, and its authors as enemies of the king and constitution. The loyalty of the people was aroused, and they soon ranged themselves on the side of the king and his ministers. Addresses and other demonstrations of popular sympathy were received from all parts of the country; and the king was thus encouraged to maintain a firm attitude in front of his opponents.[231] The tactics of the two parties in Parliament, and the conduct of their leaders, were also calculated to convert public opinion to the king's side. Too much exasperated to act with caution, the opposition ruined their cause by factious extravagance and [p.85] precipitancy. They were resolved to take the king's cabinet by storm, and without pause or parley struck incessantly at the door. Their very dread of a dissolution, which they so loudly condemned, showed little confidence in popular support. Instead of making common cause with the people, they lowered their contention to a party struggle. Constitutionally the king had a right to dismiss his ministers, and to appeal to the people to support his new administration. The opposition endeavoured to restrain him in the exercise of this right, and to coerce him by a majority of the existing House of Commons. They had overstepped the constitutional limits of their power; and the assaults directed against prerogative, recoiled upon themselves.

On the other side, Mr. Pitt, as minister, relied upon the prerogative of the king to appoint him, – the duty of Parliament to consider his measures, – and his own right to advise the king to dissolve Parliament, if those measures were obstructed. The tact, judgment, courage, and commanding talents of Mr. Pitt inspired his party with confidence, and secured popularity for his cause; while, by maintaining a defensive attitude, he offered no diversion to the factious tactics of his opponents. His accession to office had been immediately marked by the defection of several members from the opposition, – a circumstance always calculated upon by a minister in those times, – and was soon followed by the forbearance of others, who were not prepared to participate in the violent measures of their leaders. The influence of the court and government [p.86] was strenuously exerted in making converts; and the growing popularity of their cause discouraged the less zealous of their opponents.

Mr. Pitt had waited patiently while the majorities against him in Parliament were falling away, and public opinion was declaring itself, more and more, in his favour. The results of the dissolution now revealed the judgment with which he had conducted his cause, and chosen his time for appealing to the people.[232] Every preparation had been made for using the influence of the crown at the elections: the king himself took the deepest personal interest in the success of the ministerial candidates;[233] and Mr. Pitt's popularity was at its height, when Parliament was dissolved. His enemies were everywhere put to the rout, at the hustings. To support Mr. Pitt was the sole pledge of the popular candidates. Upwards of one hundred and sixty of his late opponents lost their seats;[234] and on the assembling of the new Parliament, he could scarcely reckon his majorities.[235] The minister was popular in the country, all-powerful in Parliament, and had [p.87] the entire confidence of the court. If such was the success of the minister, what was the triumph of the king! He had expelled one ministry, and retained another, in defiance of the House of Commons. The people had pressed forth loyally to his support; and by their aid, he had overborne all opposition to his will. He now possessed a strong government, and a minister in whom he confided; and he enjoyed once more power, freedom, and popularity. Not only had he overcome and ruined a party which he hated: but he had established the ascendency of the crown, which henceforth, for nearly fifty years, continued to prevail over every other power in the state.

Such results, however, were not without danger. Already the king was too prone to exercise his power; and the encouragement he had received, was likely to exalt his views of prerogative. But he had now a minister who – with higher abilities and larger views of state policy – had a will even stronger than his own. Throughout his reign, it had been the tendency of the king's personal administration to favour men whose chief merit was their subservience to his own views, instead of leaving the country to be governed, – as a free state should be governed, – by its ablest and most popular statesmen.[236] He had only had one other minister of the same lofty pretensions, – Lord Chatham; and now, while trusting that statesman's son, – sharing his councils, and approving his [p.88] policy, – he yielded to his superior intellect. Yet were the royal predilections not without influence on the minister. Reared in the Whig school, Mr. Pitt soon deserted the principles, as he had been severed from the connections, of that party. He had been raised to power by royal favour, – maintained in it by prerogative, – and was now in the ascendant, by having made common cause with the crown. Hence he naturally leant towards prerogative, and Tory principles of government. His contests with his great antagonist, Mr. Fox, and the Whig party, still further alienated him from the principles of his youth: Until the French Revolution, however, his policy was wise and liberal: but from that time his rule became arbitrary, and opposed to public liberty. And such were his talents, and such the temper of the times, that he was able to make even arbitrary principles popular. During his long administration the people were converted to Tory principles, and encouraged the king and the minister to repress liberty of thought, and to wage war against opinion. If the king was no longer his own minister, – as in the time of Lord North, – he had the satisfaction of seeing his own principles carried out by hands far abler than his own. In prosecutions of the press, and the repression of democratic movements at home,[237] the minister was, perhaps, as zealous as the king: in carrying on war to crush democracy abroad, the king was more zealous than his minister.[238] They [p.89] laboured strenuously together in support of monarchy all over the world; and respected too little the constitutional liberties of their own people.

Nor did the king relax his accustomed activity in public affairs. From the close of the American war until the breaking out of hostilities with France, his pleasure was taken by the Secretary-at-War upon every commission granted in the army; and throughout Mr. Pitt's administration, every act of the executive was submitted to him, for his judgment and approval.[239] We find him combating the opinions of his cabinet concerning foreign affairs, in elaborate papers: criticising the policy of government measures, – commenting upon debates and divisions in Parliament: praising ministers, and censuring the opposition: approving taxes: discussing amendments to bills: settling the appointment and dismissal of officers, the grant of peerages, and the preferment of bishops.[240] With his own hand be struck the name of Mr. Fox from the list of privy-councillors.[241]

And if, during the administration of Mr. Pitt, the king's independent exercise of influence was somewhat less active, the power of the crown itself, – as wielded jointly by himself [p.90] and his minister, – was greater than at any former period. The king and his minister were now absolute. A war is generally favourable to authority, by bringing together the people and the government, in a common cause and combined exertions. The French war, notwithstanding its heavy burthens and numerous failures, was popular on account of the principles it was supposed to represent; and the vast expenditure, if it distressed the people, multiplied the patronage of the crown, – afforded a rich harvest for contractors, – and made the fortunes of farmers and manufacturers, by raising the price of every description of produce. The “moneyed classes” rallied round the war minister, – bought seats in Parliament with their sudden gains, – ranged themselves in a strong phalanx behind their leader, – cheered his speeches, and voted for him in every division. Their zeal was rewarded with peerages, baronetcies, patronage, and all the good things which an inordinate expenditure enabled him to dispense. For years, opposition in Parliament to a minister thus supported, was an idle form; and if beyond its walls, the voice of complaint was raised, the arm of the law was strong and swift to silence it.[242] To oppose the minister, had become high treason to the state.

However great the king's confidence in a minister so powerful as Mr. Pitt, whenever their views of policy differed, his Majesty's resolution was as inflexible as ever. Nor were his ministers secure from the exercise of [p.91] his personal influence against them, when he was pleased to use it. The first measure on which Mr. Pitt was likely to encounter objections from the king, was that for parliamentary reform. Having pledged himself to the principles of such a measure, while in opposition, he was determined not to be unfaithful to them in office. But before he ventured to bring forward his plan, he prudently submitted it to the king, and deprecated the opposition of the court. Writing, on the 20th March, 1785, the king said, Mr. Pitt's “letter expressed that there is but one issue of the business he could look upon as fatal, that is, the possibility of the measure being rejected by the weight of those who are supposed to be connected with the government. Mr. Pitt must recollect that, though I have ever thought it unfortunate that he had early engaged himself in this measure, he ought to lay his thoughts before the House; that out of personal regard to him I would avoid giving any opinion to any one on the opening of the door to parliamentary reform, except to him; therefore I am certain Mr. Pitt cannot suspect my having influenced any one on the occasion. If others choose, for base ends, to impute such a conduct to me, I must bear it as former false suggestions.”[243] He proceeded to say that every man ought to vtce according to his own opinion; and warned Mr. Pitt that “there are questions men will not, by friendship, be biassed to adopt.” This incident is significant. Mr. Pitt apprehended the exertion of the [p.92] influence of the crown to defeat his measure. The king was aware of the suspicions attaching to himself: but while promising not to interfere, he could not refrain from intimating that the measure would be defeated, – as indeed it was, – without his interference. On both sides the personal influence of the king over the deliberations of Parliament, was fully acknowledged.

The extent to which the preponderating influence of the crown was recognised during this period, is exemplified by the political relations of parties to his Majesty and to the Prince of Wales, on the occasion of the king's illness in 1788.[244] At that time, ministers enjoyed the entire confidence of the king, and commanded an irresistible majority in Parliament; yet was it well understood by both parties, that the first act of the Regent would be to dismiss his father's ministers, and take into his councils the leaders of the opposition.[245] Thus even the party which protested against the influence of the crown was quite prepared to use it, and by its aid to brave a hostile majority in Parliament, as Mr. Pitt had successfully done a few years before.

At length Mr. Pitt's fall, like his rise, was due to the king's personal will; and was brought about in the same way as many previous political events, by irresponsible councils. There is reason to believe that Mr. Pitt's unbending temper, – increased in stubbornness by his long continued supremacy in Parliament, and in the [p.93] cabinet, – had become distasteful to the king.[246] His Majesty loved power at least as much as his minister, and was tenacious of his authority, even over those in whom he had confidence. Mr. Pitt's power had nearly overshadowed his own; and there were not wanting opinions among friends of the king, and rivals of the statesman, that the latter had “an overweening ambition, great and opiniative presumption, and perhaps not quite constitutional ideas with regard to the respect and attention due to the crown.”[247]

While this feeling existed in regard to Mr. Pitt, his Majesty was greatly agitated by events which at once aroused his sensitive jealousy of councils to which he had not been admitted, and his conscientious scruples. Mr. Pitt and his colleagues thought it necessary to inaugurate the Union of Ireland, by concessions to the Roman Catholics;[248] and had been, for some time, deliberating upon a measure to effect that object. Upon this question, the king had long entertained a very decided opinion. So far back as 1795, he had consulted Lord Kenyon as to the obligations of his coronation oath; and though his lordship's opinions were not quite decisive upon this point,[249] his Majesty was persuaded that he was [p.94] morally restrained, by that oath, from assenting to any further measures for the relief of the Roman Catholics. Long before the ministers had so far matured their proposal as to be prepared to submit it for his Majesty's approval, he had been made acquainted with their intentions. In September, 1800, Lord Loughborough had shown him a letter from Mr. Pitt upon the subject; and the Archbishop of Canterbury, at the suggestion of Lord Auckland, had also informed the king that a scheme was in contemplation, which was represented as dangerous to the church.[250] In December, the lord chancellor communicated to his Majesty an elaborate paper against the Roman Catholic claims;[251] and Dr. Stuart, Archbishop of Armagh, – a son of the king's old favourite. Lord Bute, – increased his Majesty's repugnance to the measure which the ministers were preparing.[252] The king immediately took counsel with some of the opponents of the Catholic claims; and without waiting for any communication from Mr. Pitt, lost no time in declaring his own opinion upon the measure. At the levee on the 28th January, 1801, he told Mr. Windham, the Secretary-at-War, “that he should consider any person who voted for it, as personally indisposed towards him.”[253] On the same occasion he said to [p.95] Mr. Dundas, “I shall reckon any man my personal enemy, who proposes any such measure. The most Jacobinical thing I ever heard of!”[254] On the 29th, he wrote to Mr. Addington, the Speaker, desiring him to “open Mr. Pitt's eyes on the danger arising from the agitating this improper question.”[255] Mr. Addington undertook this commission, and thought he had dissuaded Mr. Pitt from proceeding with a measure, to which the king entertained insuperable objections.[256] But if at first inclined to yield, Mr. Pitt, after consulting the cabinet and other political friends, determined to take his stand, as a responsible minister, upon the advice he was about to tender to the king. Mr. Canning is said to have advised Mr. Pitt not to give way on this occasion. It was his opinion, “that for several years so many concessions had been made, and so many important measures overruled, from the king's opposition to them, that government had been weakened exceedingly; and if on this particular occasion a stand was not made, Pitt would retain only a nominal power, while the real one would pass into the hands of those who influenced the king's mind and opinion, out of sight.”[257]

[p.96]

Whether sharing this opinion or not, Mr. Pitt himself was too deeply impressed with necessity of the measure, and perhaps too much committed to the Catholics, to withdraw it.[258] It appears, however, that he might have been induced to give way, if he could have obtained an assurance from his Majesty, that ministers should not be opposed by the king's friends in Parliament.[259] On the 1st February, he made the formal communication to the king, which his Majesty had, for several days, been expecting. The king, aware of Mr. Pitt's determination before he received this letter, had wished Mr. Addington, even then, to form a new administration. By Mr. Addington's advice, however, a kind but most unbending answer was returned to Mr. Pitt, in which his Majesty declared that a “principle of duty must prevent him from discussing any proposition tending to destroy the groundwork of our happy constitution.”[260] The intensity of the king's feeling on the subject was displayed by what he said, about this time, to the Duke of Portland: “Were he to agree to it, he should betray his trust, and forfeit his crown; that it might [p.97] bring the framers of it to the gibbet.” His trusty counsellor replied: “he was sure the king had rather suffer martyrdom, than submit to this measure.”[261] In vain did Mr. Addington endeavour to accommodate these differences. Mr. Pitt, as inflexible as the king, resigned; and Mr. Addington was entrusted with the task of forming an anti-Catholic administration; while an active canvass was undertaken by the courtiers against the Catholic cause, as a matter personal to the king himself.[262]

Mr. Pitt has been justly blamed for having so long concealed his intentions from the king. His Majesty himself complained to Lord Grenville, that the question had been under consideration since the month of August, though never communicated to him till Sunday, the 1st of February; and stated his own belief, that if the unfortunate cause of disunion had been openly mentioned to him “in the beginning, he should have been able to avert it entirely.”[263] Whether this delay arose, as Lord Malmesbury has suggested, “either from indolence,” or from want of a “sufficient and due attention to the king's pleasure,”[264] it was assuredly a serious error of judgment. It cannot, indeed, be maintained that it was Mr. Pitt's duty to take his Majesty's pleasure, before any bill had been agreed upon by the cabinet; but his [p.98] reticence, upon the general question, aroused the suspicions of the king, and gave those who differed from the minister an opportunity of concerting an opposition at court.[265]

Mr. Pitt had forfeited power rather than abandon a measure which be deemed essential to the welfare of the state. Yet a few weeks afterwards, he was so deeply affected on hearing that the king had imputed his illness to the recent conduct of his minister, that he conveyed an assurance to his Majesty, that he would not revive the Catholic question.[266] Opposition was now disarmed; and the king alone was able to shape the policy of ministers and of Parliament.

Mr. Addington enjoyed the confidence, and even the affection of the king, whose correspondence at this period resembles – both in its minute attention to every department of business, foreign or domestic,[267] and in its terms of attachment – his letters to his former favourite. Lord North.[268] His Majesty was rejoiced [p.99] to find himself free from the restraints which the character and position of Mr. Pitt had imposed upon him; and delighted to honour the minister of his own choice, – who shared his feelings and opinions, – who consulted him on every occasion, – whose amiable character and respectful devotion touched his heart, – and whose intellect was not so commanding as to overpower and subdue his own.

This administration, – formed under circumstances unfavourable to its stability, and beset, from its very commencement, with jealousies and intrigues,[269] was upheld for three years, mainly by the influence of the crown. Feeble in parliamentary talent and influence, and wanting in popular support, it was yet able to withstand the united opposition of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. At length, however, Mr. Addington, overcome by embarrassments, resigned.[270] It was not without reluctance that the king found himself obliged to part with his favourite minister, and to submit himself [p.100] again to the loftier temper of Mr. Pitt: but he was persuaded to give up an impotent administration, in a time of public danger.[271]

Mr Pitt urged the necessity of forming a strong government, by an union with Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox; but such was his Majesty's repugnance to the latter, that he absolutely refused to admit him into the cabinet.[272] So inveterate was his aversion to this statesman, – aggravated, at this period, by mental disorder, that he afterwards declared “that he had taken a positive determination not to admit Mr. Fox into his councils, even at the hazard of a civil war.”[273] Mr. Fox being proscribed, the opposition would listen to no propositions for an arrangement;[274] and Mr. Pitt was obliged to place himself at the head of an administration as weak as that which he had succeeded.

Meanwhile, Mr. Addington took up a position in the House of Commons, as leader of the “king’s friends,” – a party numbering sixty or seventy members.[275] He was still supposed to be in communication with the king,[276] and his supporters were sometimes ranged against the government.[277] He professed personal adherence to his sovereign to be the rule of his [p.101] political conduct. Writing soon after his retirement from office, he says: “I shall keep aloof from all parties, adhere to the king, and take a course that I can conscientiously justify to myself.”[278] His attitude was so formidable, that Mr. Pitt was soon obliged to admit him and his followers to a share of the government.[279] The king earnestly desired his union with Mr. Pitt, which the renewal of friendly intercourse between them easily brought about.[280] He accordingly joined the administration, as Viscount Sidmouth, and president of the Council; and induced his friends, who had been lately voting against the government, to lend it their parliamentary support. But being dissatisfied with the share of influence conceded to himself and his allies in the cabinet, he shortly afterwards threatened to resign.[281] And when, on the impeachment of Lord Melville, Mr. Hiley Addington and Mr. Bond, who had been promised places, spoke and voted against the government, differences arose between himself and Mr. Pitt, which led to his resignation.[282] In this anarchy of parties, the chief support of ministers was the influence of the crown.

Meanwhile, the only matter on which Mr. Pitt and the king were at variance, was not suffered [p.102] again to disturb their friendly relations. Mr. Pitt of had renewed the assurance which he had given the king in 1801, that he would not revive the question of Catholic emancipation, during his Majesty's life.[283] Not satisfied with this assurance, the king required an explicit declaration of his minister's determination to resist even the smallest alteration of the Test Act.[284] This latter pledge, indeed, Mr. Pitt declined to give:[285] but he was careful to avoid the forbidden ground, and was even obliged to oppose others who ventured to trespass upon it. The minister had surrendered his own judgment; and the king alone dictated the policy of Parliament.[286] Though Mr. Pitt recovered the king's confidence, his Majesty continued to form his own independent opinions, and to exercise a large influence in the government and patronage of the state.[287] He watched the debates with undiminished interest: noted the length of speeches, and the numbers in divisions; and even observed upon the shortcomings of the government whips.[288]

[p.103]

The death of Mr. Pitt, in the midst of defeats, and disasters to the European cause in which he was engaged, once more forced upon the king an administration, formed from a party in whom he had no confidence. It was necessary to accept the ministry of “all the talents,” under Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox;[289] and personal intercourse went far to overcome the king's antipathy to the latter.[290] Lord Sidmouth had a strong body of parliamentary friends, who, – to use the words of his biographer, – “constituted a species of armed neutrality, far too powerful to be safely overlooked;” and was “understood to enjoy the favour and confidence of the king, and to be faithfully devoted to his Majesty's interests.”[291] His alliance was necessary: and he was induced to join a party with whom he had neither connection, nor political sympathies. The king's friends were not to be neglected, and were amply provided for.[292] Lord Sidmouth himself, “not wishing to excite jealousy by very frequent intercourse with the king,” declined the presidency of the Council, and accepted the less prominent office of privy seal.[293]

As there was a difficulty in admitting Lord Sidmouth's political friends to the cabinet, Lord Ellenborough, the Lord Chief Justice of England, was associated with him, in [p.104] order to give weight to his councils.[294] It had been the policy of our laws to render the judges independent of the crown;[295] and now the first criminal judge became one of its confidential advisers. Ministers were strong enough to defend this appointment in Parliament, where the precedent of Lord Mansfield was much relied on: but it was severely censured in debate, and condemned by public opinion.[296]

Before the new ministry was completed, the king was alarmed at a supposed invasion of his prerogative. On the 1st February, Lord Grenville proposed to his Majesty some changes in the administration of the army, by which the question was raised whether the army should be under the immediate control of the crown, through the commander-in-chief, or be subject to the supervision of ministers. The king at once said that the management of the army rested with the crown alone; and that he could not permit his ministers to interfere with it, beyond the levying of the troops, their pay and clothing. Lord Grenville was startled at such a doctrine, which he conceived to be entirely unconstitutional, and to which he would have refused to submit. For some time it was believed that the pending [p.105] ministerial arrangements would be broken off: but on the following day Lord Grenville presented a minute to his Majesty, stating that no changes in the management of the army should be effected without his Majesty's approbation.[297] To the doctrine thus amended, there could be no reasonable objection, and the king assented to it.

The Grenville ministry maintained its ground, so long as it was tolerated at court: but when it ventured to offend the king’s religious scruples, it fell suddenly, like that of Mr. Pitt in 1801.[298] To conciliate the Catholics they proposed to remove some of the disqualifications of officers in the army and navy, being Roman Catholics and Dissenters: but in framing: the measure, ministers either neglected to explain its provisions with sufficient distinctness to the king, or failed to make themselves understood. After the bill had been introduced, as they believed, with his “reluctant assent,” his Majesty's distaste for it became inflamed into violent disapprobation. To propose such a measure, however just and politic, was a strange indiscretion. Knowing the king's repugnance to every concession to the Catholics, they might have profited by the experience of Mr. Pitt. The chancellor foresaw the danger they were incurring; and with Lord Ellenborough and Lord Sidmouth, protested against the measure. The friends of the government called it an act of suicide.[299]

[p.106]

The king's friends, and the opponents of the ministry, did not neglect this favourable opportunity of turning his Majesty’s well-known religious scruples to account; but soon directed his personal influence against his ministers. On the 4th March, Lord Sidmouth “apprised his Majesty of the nature and details of the measure;” said he should himself oppose it; and soon afterwards tendered his resignation to Lord Grenville.[300] On the 12th, the Duke of Portland wrote to the king, expressing his belief that the measure had not received his Majesty's consent, and that it could be defeated in the House of Lords. “But for this purpose,” said his grace, “I must fairly state to your Majesty, that your wishes must be distinctly known, and that your present ministers should not have any pretext for equivocating upon the subject, or any ground whatever to pretend ignorance of your Majesty's sentiments and determination, not only to withhold your sanction from the present measure, but to use all your influence in resisting it.”[301] Writing on the same day, his [p.107] grace said: “His Majesty has signified his orders to my nephews, Lords George and James Thynne, to vote against it.”[302] On the following day a person came to Lord Malmesbury from the Queen's house, authorised to say, “that his Majesty's wishes, sentiments, and intentions, respecting every measure which may lead to alter the legal restrictions the Catholics are liable to, are invariably the same as they always have been, and always will be so.”[303] The king himself also intimated to Lord Grenville, that “he should certainly think it right to make it known that his sentiments were against the measure.”[304]

Hence it appears that courtiers and intriguing statesmen were still as ready as they had been twenty-five years before, to influence the king against his ministers, and to use his name for the purpose of defeating measures in Parliament; while the king himself was not more scrupulous in committing himself to irregular interference with the freedom of parliamentary deliberations. On this occasion, however, opposition to the ministry in Parliament by the king's friends, was averted by the withdrawal of the measure. On announcing its abandonment to the king, ministers committed a second indiscretion, – far greater than the first. They reserved to themselves, by a minute of the cabinet, the right of openly avowing their sentiments, should the Catholic petition be presented, and of [p.108] submitting to His Majesty, from time to time, such measures as they might deem it advisable to propose.”[305] The king not only desired them to withdraw this part of the minute, but demanded from them a written declaration that they would never, under any circumstances, propose to him further concessions to the Catholics, or even offer him advice upon the subject.[306] To such a pledge it was impossible for constitutional ministers to submit. They were responsible for all public measures, and for the good government of the country; and yet, having abandoned a measure which they had already proposed, they were now called upon to fetter their future discretion, and to bind themselves irrevocably to a policy which they thought dangerous to the peace of Ireland. The king could scarcely have expected such submission. Ministers refused the pledge, in becoming terms; and the king proceeded to form a new administration under the Duke of Portland and Mr. Perceval. He had regarded this contest with his ministers as “a struggle for his throne;” saying, “he must be the Protestant king of a Protestant country, or no king.”[307] Such fears, [p.109] however, were idle in a monarch who could cast down ministers and sway Parliaments, at his pleasure. He had overcome the giant power of Mr. Pitt, and Lord Grenville was now at his feet.

The dismissal of ministers, and the constitutional dangers involved in such an exercise of prerogative, did not pass without animadversion in Parliament. They were discussed in both houses on the 26^th March;[308] and on the 9th April, Mr. Brand moved a resolution in the Commons, “that it is contrary to the first duties of the confidential servants of the crown to restrain themselves by any pledge, expressed or implied, from offering to the king any advice which the course of circumstances may render necessary for the welfare and security of the empire.” In support of this motion it was argued, that the king being irresponsible, if ministers should also claim to be absolved from responsibility, by reason of pledges exacted from them, there would be no security fur the people against the evils of bad government. Had ministers agreed to such a pledge, they would have violated their oaths as privy councilors, and the king would have become absolute. Nor did the conduct of secret advisers escape notice, who had counteracted the measures of the public and responsible advisers of the crown.[309] On the other side it was contended that the stipulation proposed by ministers, of being at liberty to support in debate a measure which they had withdrawn, – [p.110] and of which the king disapproved, – was unconstitutional, – as tending to place the king in direct opposition to Parliament, – an evil which was ordinarily avoided by ministers refraining from supporting any measure to which the king might hereafter have to give his veto. The late ministers were even charged with not having, in the explanation of the causes of their retirement, arraigned their sovereign at the bar of Parliament.[310] Mr. Perceval denied that the king had conferred with any secret advisers until after the ministers were dismissed; and said that, in requiring the pledge, he had acted without any advice whatever. Ministers, he declared, had brought the pledge upon themselves, which would never have been suggested, had they not desired to impose conditions upon his Majesty.

Sir Samuel Romilly went so far as to maintain that if ministers had subscribed such a pledge, they would have been guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour.[311] With regard to Mr. Perceval's statement, that the king had acted without advice, Sir Samuel affirmed, that there could be no exercise of prerogative in which the king was without some adviser. He might seek the counsels of any man, however objectionable: but that man would be responsible for the advice given, and for the acts of the crown. There was no constitutional doctrine more important than this, for the protection of the crown. “History had unfolded the evils of a contrary principle [p.111] having prevailed.” It was also well observed by Mr. Whitbread, that the avowal of ministers that the king had acted without advice, amounted to a declaration on their part, that they disowned the responsibility of the act complained of, and left his Majesty to bear the blame of it himself, without that protection which the constitution had provided: but that from this responsibility they could not escape; for by accepting office, they had assumed the responsibility which they had shown so much anxiety to avoid.

But Lord Howick denied that the king had acted without advice, and asserted that there had been secret advisers, who had taken pains to poison the royal mind.[312] On the Saturday before the pledge had been required, Lord Eldon had an audience; and both Lord Eldon and Lord Hawkesbury were consulted by the king, before measures were taken for forming a new administration. They were, therefore, the king's responsible advisers. In answer to these allegations, Mr. Canning stated that Lord Eldon's visit to Windsor had taken place on Saturday se'nnight, preceding the change of ministry; that it had reference to a matter of extreme delicacy, unconnected with these events, and that before he went. Lord Eldon had explained to Lord Grenville the object of his visit, and promised to mention no other subject to his Majesty.[313] He added, that the Duke of Portland, Mr. Perceval, [p.112] and himself, had endeavoured to prevent the separation between the late ministers and the king, by amicable explanations. Mr. Canning concluded by saying, that the ministers were “determined to stand by their sovereign, even though circumstances should occur in which they may find it their duty to appeal to the country.”[314] In answer to this threat, Lord Henry Petty said that a great constitutional wrong had been done, and that no such intimidation would induce the House to refrain from expressing their sense of it. During the division, Lord Howick addressed the members in the lobby, and said that, being nearly certain of a majority,[315] they must follow up their success with “an address to the throne, to meet the threat which had been thrown out that evening, – a threat unexampled in the annals of Parliament.”[316] But the king and his adherents were too strong for the opposition, whose friends, already looking to the court, left them in a minority of thirty-two.[317]

On the 13th April, a discussion was raised in the House of Lords upon a motion to the same effect, proposed by the Marquess [p.113] of Stafford. The most remarkable speech was that of Lord Erskine, who had already expressed his opinions on the subject, to the king himself.[318] Not being himself, on account of religious scruples, favourable to the Catholic claims, he yet ridiculed the argument that the king had been restrained by his coronation oath, from assenting to the late measure. He had assented to the Act of 1793, which admitted Catholic majors and colonels to the army, without perjury: – how then could his oath be violated by the admission of staff-officers? On the question of the pledge he asked, “Is it consistent with the laws and customs of the realm that the king shall make a rule for his own conduct, which his councillors shall not break in upon, to disturb with their advice?” If it were, “the king, instead of submitting to be advised by his councillors, might give the rule himself as to what he will be advised in, until those who are solemnly sworn to give full and impartial counsel, and who are responsible to the public for their conduct as his advisers, might be penned up in a corner of their duties and jurisdiction, and the state might go to ruin.” Again, as to the personal responsibility of the king, he laid it down that “the king can perform no act of government himself, and no man ought to be received within the walls of this House, to declare that any act of government has proceeded from the private will and determination, or conscience of the king. The king, as chief magistrate, [p.114] can have no conscience which is not in the trust of responsible subjects. When he delivers the seals of office to his officers of state, his conscience, as it regards the state, accompanies them.” “No act of state or government can, therefore, be the king's: he cannot act but by advice; and he who holds office sanctions what is done, from whatever source it may proceed.”[319]

By Lord Harrowby the motion was represented as placing the House in the situation “of sitting in judgment upon the personal conduct of their sovereign.” But perhaps the best position for the crown was that assumed by Lord Selkirk. The king, he said, could not be accountable to Parliament for his conduct in changing his advisers; and the proposed pledge was merely a motive for such a change, beyond the reach of parliamentary investigation. Another view was that of Lord Sidmouth. Admitting that for every act of the executive government there must be a responsible adviser, he “contended that there were many functions of the sovereign which, though strictly legitimate, not only might, but must be performed without any such responsibility being attached to them, and which must, therefore, be considered as the personal acts of the king. Of these the constitution does not take cognisance.”[320] It was the object of tins ingenious argument to absolve from responsibility both the king, who could do no wrong, and his present advisers, who, by accepting office, had become responsible for [p.115] the measures by which their predecessors had been removed. This unconstitutional position was well exposed by the Earl of Lauderdale, who felicitously cited the example of Lord Danby, in support of the principle that the king can have no separate responsibility. Lord Danby, having been impeached for offences committed as a minister, had produced in his defence, a written authority from the king himself, but was yet held responsible for the execution of the king's commands: nay, the House of Commons voted his plea an aggravation of his offences, as exposing the king to public odium.[321] The same argument was ably enforced by Lord Holland. That for every act of the crown some adviser must be responsible, – could not, indeed, be denied: but the artifice of putting forth the king personally, and representing him as on his trial at the bar, – this repeated use of the king's name, was a tower of strength to the ministerial party.[322] Lord Stafford's motion was superseded by the adjournment of the House, which was carried by a majority of eighty-one.[323]

The question, however, was not yet suffered to rest. On the 15th April, Mr. W. H. Lyttletleton renewed the discussion, in proposing a resolution expressing regret at the late changes in his Majesty's councils. The debate added little to the arguments on either side, and was [p.116] brought to a close by the House resolving to pass to the orders of the day.[324]

As a question of policy, it had obviously been a false step, on the part of the ministers, to give expression to their reservations, in the minute of the cabinet. They had agreed to abandon the bill which had caused the difference between themselves and his Majesty; and, by virtue of their office, as the king's ministers, were free, on any future occasion, to offer such advice as they might think proper. By their ill-advised minute, they invited the retaliation of this obnoxious pledge. But no constitutional writer would now be found to defend the pledge itself, or to maintain that the ministers who accepted office in consequence of the refusal of that pledge, had not taken upon themselves the same responsibility as if they had advised it.

Meanwhile, though this was the first session of a new Parliament, a speedy dissolution was determined upon. Advantage was taken of the prevalent anti-Catholic feeling which it was feared might subside: but the main issue raised by this appeal to the country was the propriety of the recent exercise of prerogative. In the Lords Commissioners' speech, on the 27th April, the king said he was “anxious to recur to the sense of his people, while the events which have recently taken place are yet fresh in their recollection.” And he distinctly invited their opinion upon them, by declaring that “he at once demonstrates, in the most unequivocal [p.117] manner, his own conscientious persuasion of the rectitude of those motives upon which he has acted, and affords to his people the best opportunity of testifying their determination to support him in every exercise of the prerogatives of his crown, which is conformable to the sacred obligations under which they are held, and conducive to the welfare of his kingdom, and to the security of the constitution.” The recent exercise of prerogative was thus associated with the obligations of his coronation oath, so as to unite, in favour of the new ministers, the loyalty of the people, their personal attachment to the sovereign, and their zeal for the Protestant establishment. Without such appeals to the loyalty and religious feelings of the people, the influence of the crown was alone sufficient to command a majority for ministers; and their success was complete.

On the meeting of the new Parliament, amendments to the address were proposed in both Houses, condemning the dissolution, as founded upon “groundless and injurious pretenses;” but were rejected by large majorities.[325]

The king's will had prevailed, and was not again to be called in question. His own power, confided to the Tory ministers henceforth admitted to his councils, was supreme. Though there was still a party of the king's friends,[326] his Majesty agreed too well with his ministers, in [p.118] principles and policy, to require the aid of irresponsible advisers. But this rule, once more absolute, – after the struggles of fifty years, – was drawing to a close. The will, that had been so strong and unbending, succumbed to disease; and a reign in which the king had been so resolute to govern, ended in a royal “phantom,” and a regency.[327]