Chapter II: The Influence of the Crown during the Regency, the Reigns of George III., William IV., and Her Majesty Queen Victoria.
[p.119]
The Prince Regent differed too much, in character and habits, from his royal father, to be inclined to exercise the influence of the crown, with the same activity. George III., eager for power, had also delighted in business, to which he had trained himself from early youth.[1] With greater abilities, and superior education, the prince was fond of ease and pleasure, and averse to business. His was not the temperament to seek the labour and anxieties of public affairs: nor had power devolved upon him, until the ambitious spirit of youth had ceased to prompt him to exertion. He loved the “pomp and circumstance” of royalty, without its cares, But though disinclined to the daily toils which his father had undergone for fifty years, – and disposed, by indolence and indifference, to leave more discretion to his ministers, in the ordinary affairs of state: yet whenever his own feelings or interests were concerned, his father himself had scarcely been more imperative.
[p.120]
The very qualities, however, which disinclined the Prince to laborious activity, exposed him the more readily to the influence of his court. His father's will was strong, and full of energy: his own, inconstant and capricious. The father had judged for himself, with rude vigour and decision: the son, – impulsive, indolent, and without strength of principle or conviction, – was swayed by the advice of those nearest to his person.
The early events of the regency displayed at once the preponderating influence of the crown, over all other powers of the state, and the subjection of the regent to the counsels of the court.
To politics, apart from their relations to himself, the prince was indifferent: and his indifference led to the same results, as the king's strong predilections. He readily gave up the opinions, as well as the political friends of his youth. As to his friends, indeed, he had been separated from them for many years, by the French Revolution:[2] “the death of Mr. Fox had more recently loosened the tie which had bound them together: the part taken by them against the Duke of York, had further relaxed it; and the proud bearing of the great Whig leaders, – little congenial to the lighter manners of the court, – had nearly broken it asunder. But lately they had exerted [p.121] themselves strenuously against the restrictions upon the powers of the regent, which the Government, following the precedent of 1788, had proposed; and their general views of policy were supposed to coincide with his own.
Other circumstances pointed strongly to their being now called to office. The Perceval administration, which had owed its origin to the king's dread of the Roman Catholic claims, was weak and disunited; and while the leading statesmen of all other parties were favourable to the Roman Catholic cause, the sole merit of this ministry lay in their opposition to it. Mr. Perceval himself had been personally obnoxious to the prince, as the friend and adviser of his detested princess, Caroline of Brunswick: nor had the chancellor, Lord Eldon, been free from the same offence. The regent had also suspected the latter of keeping him at a distance from his father, and told his lordship afterwards “that there was no person in the whole world that he hated so much, as for years he had hated him.”[3]
The prince had further raised the expectations of the opposition, by confiding to Lord Grenville and Lord Grey the drawing up of his answer to the joint resolutions of the two Houses on the conditions of the regency; and he, as suddenly, repressed these expectations by rejecting their draft for another, – the composition of himself and Mr. Sheridan. This proceeding, so contrary to the views of these noblemen, as [p.122] responsible advisers, drew from them a remonstrance, which, however constitutional in doctrine, was too lofty in its tone, and partook too much of the character of a lecture, to be altogether acceptable to the prince.[4]
While the Regency Bill was passing through Parliament, the prince had frequent communications with the opposition. The plan of a new administration was concerted, and several of the principal places were allotted to the Whig leaders. So assured were they of their speedy accession to power, that, jealous of the influence of Lord Moira and Mr. Sheridan, they were already insisting that the prince should engage to consult none but his future ministers.[5] Nor were ministers less persuaded of the impending change.[6] The king himself, in his lucid intervals, was informed of it by his chancellor; and was prepared to restore his old servants when he recovered.[7] But before the Regency Bill had received the royal assent, the queen addressed a letter to the prince, suggesting the serious consequences which a change of ministry might have upon the king's recovery. The prince accordingly acquainted Lord Grenville that the state of his Majesty's health prevented the removal of ministers: but that his [p.123] confidence was entirely with his lordship, Lord Grey, and his other friends.[8]
When the restrictions upon the prince's power, as regent, were about to expire, and the king's recovery had become more improbable, it should was still believed that he would, at length, form a new administration consisting of the opposition leaders. He contented himself, however, with proposing, through the Duke of York, that “some of those persons with whom the early habits of his public life were formed,” should agree to strengthen Mr. Perceval's administration, – a proposal which they could scarcely have been expected to accept.[9] In suggesting this arrangement, he truly avowed that he had “no predilections to indulge;” having now become as indifferent to the principles, as to the persons, of the Whig leaders.
Restrained for a time, by the possibility of the king's recovery,[10] from making any changes, he had easily become satisfied with existing arrangements, – his contentment being increased by a liberal civil list. This result was imputed to secret counsels, – to the persuasion of the queen, the Hertford family, and the court. Parliament [p.124] and the press resounded with denunciations of these covert influences.[11] But the events of this period had a deeper import than the intrigues of a court, and the disappointments of a party. They marked the paramount influence of the crown, in the government of the country. Here were the two great parties in the state looking to royal favour alone, as the source of their power. It was never doubted by ministers, that, if they retained the confidence of the prince regent, they would be able to command the support of Parliament. It was never doubted by the opposition, that, if invited to accept office, they would be able to maintain their position as firmly as those ministers whom they were seeking to displace. Both parties were assured, that the support of Parliament would follow the confidence of the crown. The Whigs had relied upon the personal friendship of the prince regent: but ministers, having supplanted their rivals in court favour, continued to govern the country with the acquiescence of an obsequious Parliament. There was no appeal, on either side, to political principles or policy, or to public service: but all alike looked upwards to the court. The Tory party happened to prevail; and the [p.125] government of the state was, therefore, conducted on Tory principles. If the Whig party had been placed in power, without any change in public opinion, Whig principles would have been in the ascendant.
The assassination of Mr. Perceval made an unexpected opening for a new ministry: but the court appears to have been resolved that no considerable change should follow. Overtures were made to Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning, to strengthen a government to whose policy they were opposed: but – as had doubtless been expected – they refused such conditions.[12] The old government would have been at once revived, had not the Commons addressed the regent, on the motion of Mr. Stuart Wortley, to take measures “to form a strong and efficient administration.”[13] Lord Wellesley was now commissioned to form a ministry: but none of the existing ministers would listen to his overtures; and the opposition declined to accept such a share of the cabinet as was offered to them; and thus his lordship's mission failed, as the court had, probably, intended.[14]
At length Lord Moira – the intimate friend of the prince, and the unconscious tool of the court – was charged to consult with Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, on the formation of an [p.126] administration. He stated that he had received this commission without any restrictions upon the consideration of such points as they judged useful for his service. Nothing could exceed the apparent fairness of this proposal; but, as Lords Grey and Grenville had received information that no changes would be permitted in the royal household,[15] they inquired whether they should be at liberty to consider appointments to those great offices in the household, which were usually included in political arrangements, on a change of ministry. Lord Moira, having obtained the prince's consent to part with the officers of the household, if he should advise it, had assured his royal highness, before he undertook this mission, “that he should not part with one of them.” In execution of his promise, he now said that it would be impossible for him to concur in the necessity of changing the household on the formation of a new ministry; and upon this issue the negotiations were broken off. As the views of Lord Moira on the one side, and of the Whigs on the other, had been well known before Lord Moira received his commission,[16] this proposal would seem to have been as illusory as those which had preceded it. But there was yet another artifice practiced upon the opposition leaders. Though Lord Moira had determined not to agree to any alteration in the household. Lord Hertford, Lord Yarmouth, and other officers had resolved to resign their offices at [p.127] court, should the opposition undertake to form a government. But this important information was prevented, by court intrigues, from reaching the noble lords who were conducting the negotiations.[17] They insisted upon the change in order to give “to a new government that character of efficiency and stability, and those marks of the constitutional support of the crown, which were required to enable it to act usefully for the public service.” Lord Moira rested his resistance to a claim, – which, according to custom, could hardly have been opposed in any bona fide consultations, – on the ground that changes in the household would give countenance to the imputations which had been thrown upon the court. It need hardly be said that his conduct produced the very result which he had professed his anxiety to avert.
The leaders of the opposition were persuaded of the hollowness of all the proposals which had been made to them: and, knowing the hostility of the court, were as unwilling as their Opponents that these overtures should lead to any result. Had they been loss lofty and unbending, they might perhaps have overcome the obstacles which they dreaded. The regent had not the stubborn will of his royal father, and might have been won over to their side again, if they had once established themselves at court. So thought many of their disappointed followers: but the great lords [p.128] judged otherwise, and proudly shrank from the ungracious task of combating the disfavour of the prince, and the intrigues of his courtiers.[18] The prince, indeed, had now become so violent against the opposition, that we are reminded of George III. in the days of the coalition. “He told Lord Wellesley that he had no objection to one or two of them individually, but as a body he would rather abdicate the regency than ever come into contact with them.”[19] And again, after the failure of Lord Moira's mission – “three times that day, before dinner and after dinner, he declared that if Lord Grey had been forced upon him, he should have abdicated.”[20]
These negotiations, meanwhile, had served their purpose. The old administration was immediately reconstituted, under the Earl of Liverpool; and when complaints were made in the House of Commons, that a strong administration had not been formed, in compliance with their address, the blame was thrown upon the impracticable leaders of the opposition. Ministers were now safe, and gained an easy triumph over Mr. Stuart Wortley and Lord Milton, who endeavoured to unsettle the government, by further representations to the regent.[21]
[p.129]
Henceforth the ascendency of Tory politics, which George III. had established, and which the regent had been expected to overthrow, was maintained more firmly than ever. By the influence of the crown it had been created; and by the same influence it was upheld during the regency, and throughout the reign of George IV. All opposition being thus defeated, and the ministers and the court party being agreed, the prince regent had no further need of personal interposition in the government of the country.
On his accession to the throne, he was dissatisfied with ministers, for resisting his demands for a larger civil list: but submitted to their judgment, and even, in his speech to Parliament, disclaimed any wish fur an increased revenue.[22] Soon afterwards his painful relations with the queen led to proceedings of which his ministers could not approve: but in which, – with the honourable exception of Mr. Canning,[23] – they were induced to support him. The king's personal feelings and honour were concerned; and the embarrassing conduct of the queen herself, led them to accept the responsibility of measures to which the king already stood committed. No sooner had he succeeded to the throne than he desired to obtain a divorce; but his ministers, at that time, resisted his wishes, and explained their objections, in some able minutes of [p.130] the cabinet.[24] He obtained from them, however, an assurance that, if her Majesty should return to England, they would no longer oppose him in his cherished object.[25] They were little prepared for so embarrassing an event: but it was soon to be brought about by the offensive measures which the king had taken, and his ministers had sanctioned, against her.
The queen had already been irritated by two great insults. Our ambassadors, acting upon their instructions from home, had prevented her recognition as queen of England at foreign courts; and her name had been omitted, by command of the king, from the liturgy of the church. Even the legality of this latter act was much doubted.[26] It was at least so disputable as to be an unwise exercise of the prerogative.[27] Such insults as these, naturally provoked the queen to insist upon her proper recognition. At the same time they aroused popular sympathy in her cause, which encouraged her to proceed to extremities. The ministers vainly attempted a compromise: but it was too late. The queen was already on her way to England, loudly asserting her rights. They endeavoured to prevent her approach, by submitting a proposal that she [p.131] should receive an annuity of 50,000l. a year, on renouncing her title, and continuing to reside abroad; and threatening proceedings against her in Parliament, if she refused these conditions. She refused them, and hastened to England, – when preliminary proceedings were at once commenced. Even now there was still hope of a compromise, sought by the queen herself. The king was willing to drop all further proceedings against her, and to recognise her title, on condition of her residing abroad; but the queen demanded the restoration of her name in the liturgy, and her recognition in at least one foreign court, – which the king refused to concede.[28]
And now the threat was carried out to the fullest extent, by the introduction of a bill into the House of Lords, to deprive her Majesty of her title, prerogatives, and rights, and to dissolve her marriage with the king. Ministers were fully sensible of the difficulties, and even of the danger, of yielding to the king's desire to prosecute this formidable measure. Lord Eldon, writing in June, 1820, said, “I think no administration, who have any regard for him, will go the length he wishes, as an administration, – and if they will, they cannot take Parliament along with them: that body is afraid of disclosures, – not on one side only, – which may affect the monarchy itself.”[29] But on the failure of all their attempts to effect an accommodation of the [p.132] royal differences, they yielded, – against their better judgment, – to the revengeful spirit of the king.
The disgraceful incidents of the “queen's trial” are too well known to need repetition, even if they ought otherwise to find a place in this history. But what were the constitutional aspects of the case? The king had resolved to execute an act of vengeance rather than of justice against the queen, – whose wrongs had aroused for her protection, the strongest popular feelings, – sympathy with a woman, and resentment of oppression. All the power of the crown was arrayed on one side, and the excited passions of the people on the other. The impending conflict was viewed with alarm by statesmen of all parties. Many sagacious observers dreaded a civil war. Ministers foresaw the dangers to which the country was exposed: they disapproved of proceedings which, without their acquiescence, could not have been attempted; – yet they lent themselves to gratify the anger and hatred of the king. They were saved from the consummation of their worst fears by the withdrawal of the Bill of pains and penalties, at its last stage in the House of Lords: but in proceeding so far, in opposition to their own judgment, they had sinned against their constitutional obligations, as responsible ministers. By consenting to act as instruments of the king's pleasure, they brought him into dangerous collision with his people. Had they refused to permit, what they could not justify to Parliament or the country, they would have spared the king his humiliation, and the state its perils.
[p.133]
Not to have supported the king in a cause affecting his deepest feelings and his honour, might have exposed them to the reproach of deserting their royal master in his utmost need, and even of siding with his hated consort:[30] but a higher sense of their responsibilities, and greater firmness in asserting them, would have made them mediators between the king, on the one side, and the queen, the Parliament, and the people, on the other.[31]
The opposition had espoused the queen's cause, – some to protect her from oppression, – some to lead a popular cause against the ministers, – and others, like Cobbett, to gratify their bitter hatred of the government. The king's resentment against those who had opposed him in Parliament, equalled that of his father against Mr. Fox. Mr. Fremantle, writing on the 29th December, 1820, to the Marquess of Buckingham, said: “His invective against Lord Grey was stronger and more violent than I can possibly repeat;” and again: “what I am most anxious to observe to you, was his increased hostility and indignation [p.134] against the opposition, and more personally against Lord Grey.[32] Yet the same acute observer, who knew the king well, writing again on the 24th January 1821, said: “Lord Grenville fancies a Whig government could not last six months, reasoning from the conduct of George III.: but in this I am persuaded he would find himself deceived, for the same decision and steadiness of mind does not belong to his successor. And should the change once take place, new attachments and habits would prevail, and obliterate all former anger.”[33]
Meanwhile, the popularity of the king, which had suffered for a time from these proceedings, was speedily recovered. The monarchy had sustained no permanent injury: its influence was not in the least impaired. The personal character of the king was not such as to command the respect or attachment of the people: yet at no previous period had their loyalty been more devoted – never, perhaps, had the adulation of royalty been so extravagant and servile. There were discontent and turbulence among some classes of the people: but the crown and its ministers continued to rule supreme over Parliament, the press, the society and the public opinion of the country.
Though the influence of the crown was acknowledged as fully as in the late reign, it had not been brought under Parliamentary discussion for many years; when, in 1822, Mr. Brougham introduced a motion on the [p.135] subject. He proposed to declare that the influence of the crown was “unnecessary for maintaining its constitutional prerogatives, destructive of the independence of Parliament, and inconsistent with the well-governing of the realm.”[34] By comparing the present expenditure with that of 1780, – the number of places and commissions, the cost of collecting the revenue, and the host of persons looking up to government for patronage, – he pronounced the influence of the crown to have been greatly increased since Mr. Dunning's celebrated resolution. He admitted, however, that the number of placemen in the House had been diminished. In the time of Lord Carteret there had been two hundred, and at an antecedent period even three hundred: in 1780 there had been between eighty and ninety; and in 1822, eighty-seven, – many of whom, however, could not be said to be dependent on the crown. He drew an entertaining historical sketch of the manner in which every party, in turn, so long as it held office, had enjoyed the confidence of the House of Commons, but had lost that confidence immediately it was in opposition, – a coincidence to be attributed to the ascendency of the crown, which alone enabled any ministry to command a majority. Lord Londonderry, in a judicious speech, pointed out that the authority of the crown had been controlled by the increasing freedom of the press, and by other causes; and after a debate of some interest, Mr. Brougham's motion was negatived by a large majority. It was [p.136] not by paring down prerogative and patronage, but by enlarging the liberties of the people, that the influence of the crown was destined to be controlled.
Early in his reign, the king was supposed to be in favour of a measure for the relief of the Roman Catholics; and its friends were even speculating upon his encouragement to carry it through Parliament.[35] But in 1824, he had become “violently anti-Catholic;” and so paramount was his influence supposed to be over the deliberations of Parliament, that the friends of the cause believed it to be hopeless.[36] Until the death of Lord Liverpool, the Catholic claims having small hope of success, the king was content to make known his opinions in conversation, and through common reports.[37] But when Mr. Canning, the brilliant champion of the Roman Catholics, had become first minister, his Majesty thought it necessary to declare his sentiments, in a more authentic shape. And accordingly he sent for the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Bishop of London, and “directed them to make known to their clergy that his sentiments on the coronation oath, and on the Catholic question, were those his revered father, George III., and lamented brother, the Duke of York, had maintained during their lives, and [p.137] which he himself had professed when Prince of Wales, and which nothing could shake; finally, assuring them that the recent ministerial arrangements were the result of circumstances, to his Majesty equally unforeseen and unpleasant.”[38] And when political necessity had wrung from Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington, a conviction that a measure of relief could no longer be withheld, it was with extreme difficulty that they obtained his assent to its introduction.[39] After he had given his consent, he retracted, and again yielded it: – attempted to deny, or explain it away to his anti-Catholic advisers: – complained of his ministers, and claimed the pity of his friends. “If I do give my assent,” said he, “I'll go to the baths abroad, and from thence to Hanover: I'll return no more to England... I'll return no more: let them get a Catholic king in Clarence.” Such had once been the threat of the stout old king, who, whatever his faults, at least had firmness and strength of will. But the king who now uttered these feeble lamentations, found solace in his trouble, by throwing his arms round the neck of the aged Eldon.[40] And again, in imitation of his father, – having assented [p.138] to the passing of the Act, which he had deliberately authorised his ministers to carry, – he gratified his animosity against those who had supported it, – particularly the peers and bishops, – by marked incivility at his levée; while he loaded with attentions those who had distinguished themselves by opposition to the government.[41]
This concession to the Roman Catholics, – which the ablest statesmen of all parties concurred in supporting, – had already been delayed for thirty years, by the influence of the crown. Happily this influence had now fallen into weaker hands; or it might still have prevailed over wiser counsels, and the grave interests of the state.
Hitherto we have seen the influence of the crown invariably exercised against a liberal policy and often against the rights and liberties of the people. But the earlier years of the reign of William IV. presented the novel spectacle of the prerogatives and personal influence of the king being exerted, in a great popular cause, on behalf of the people. At various times, small expedients had been tried with a view to restrain the influence of the crown: but the reform bill, by increasing the real power of the people in the House of Commons, was the first great measure calculated to effect that object; and this measure, it was everywhere proclaimed that the king himself approved. The ministers themselves announced his Majesty's entire confidence in their policy, and his [p.139] determination to support them;[42] and the advocates of the cause, in every part of the country, declared that the king was on their side.
Yet, in truth, the attitude of the king in regard to this measure, at first resembled that which his royal predecessors had maintained against a progressive policy. When ministers first proposed to introduce it, he regarded it with dislike and apprehension: he dreaded the increasing influence and activity of the Commons, and, – alarmed by the spirit in which they had investigated the expenditure of his civil list, – he feared lest, strengthened by a more popular representation, they should encroach upon his own prerogatives and independence.[43] The royal family and the court were also averse to the measure, and to the ministers. But when his Majesty had given his consent to the scheme submitted by the cabinet, he was gratified by its popularity, – in which he largely shared, – and which its supporters adroitly contrived to associate with his Majesty's personal character, and supposed political sympathies.
He was still distrustful of his ministers and their policy; yet while the tide of popular favour was running high, and no political danger was immediately impending, he gave them his support and countenance. On their side, they were not slow to take advantage of the influence of his name: they [p.140] knew that it would be a great aid to their cause; and, sensible of the insecurity of his favour, they took care that it should be widely proclaimed, as long as it lasted. Politicians like Lord Eldon, who, for forty years, had relied upon the influence of the crown to resist every popular measure, – even when proposed by its own responsible ministers, – were now scandalised by this “unconstitutional” cry.[44] Yet what did this cry, in truth, import? The state of parties in Parliament, and of popular feeling in the country, had brought into the king's service a ministry pledged to the cause of Parliamentary reform. To this ministry he had given his confidence. George III., by some bold stroke or cunning manoeuvre, would soon have set himself free from such a ministry. George IV., after giving a doubtful assent to their policy, would have reserved his confidence and his sympathies for their opponents: but William IV. at this time, took a part at once manly and constitutional. His responsible ministers had advised the passing of a great measure, and he had accepted their advice. They were now engaged in a fierce parliamentary struggle; and the king gave them, – what they were entitled to expect, – his open confidence. So long as they enjoyed this confidence, he exercised his prerogatives and influence according to their counsels. His powers were used in the spirit of the constitution, – not independently, or secretly, – but on the avowed advice and responsibility of his ministers.
[p.141]
The king was called upon, at a critical period, to exercise his prerogative of dissolving Parliament. In 1831, a new Parliament was yet in its first session: but having been assembled under the auspices of the late administration, before the popular feelings in favour of parliamentary reform had been aroused, it had become evident that a reform ministry, and this Parliament, could not exist together. The ministers, having been twice defeated in three days,[45] had no alternative but to resign their offices, or to appeal from the House of Commons to the people; and they urged the necessity of an immediate dissolution. The time was full of peril, and the king hesitated to adopt the bold advice of his ministers;[46] but when at length he yielded his assent,[47] the prerogative was exercised at once, and by the king in person.[48] If there was something unseemly in the haste with which this was done, and unusual in the manner of doing it, – the occasion was one demanding the promptest action. Lord Wharncliffe had given notice of a motion for an address to the king, remonstrating against a dissolution; and his motion was actually under discussion in the House of Lords, when the [p.142] king arrived to prorogue Parliament.[49] Both houses would probably have joined in such an address, had time been allowed them, and would have interposed embarrassing obstacles to the exercise of the king's prerogative. By this sudden appeal to the people, ministers at once deprived their opponents of the vantage-ground of parliamentary opposition.
The dissolution resulted in an overpowering majority of the new House of Commons, in favour of the government reform bill. And now the House of Lords, exercising its constitutional right, rejected it. So important a measure was trying all the powers of the state, to their utmost tension. The popular excitement was so great that it was impossible for ministers to yield. The king, though disturbed by increasing apprehensions,[50] – still upheld them, and the Commons supported them by a vote of confidence. All the political forces of the country were thus combined against the House of Lords.
After a short prorogation, a third reform bill was by the Commons. The position of the Lords was now too perilous not to cause some wavering; and the second reading of the bill was accordingly agreed to, by the small majority of nine. This concession, however, was followed by an adverse vote in Committee. A graver question of prerogative had now to be considered. An appeal from the House of [143] Commons to the people had been decisive: but what appeal was there from the House of Lords? None, save to the crown, to which that body owed its existence. A creation of peers was the ultima ratio, which, after serious doubts and misgivings, ministers submitted to the king.[51] His Majesty's resolution had already been shaken by the threatening aspect of affairs, and by the apprehensions of his family and court;[52] and he, not unnaturally, shrank from so startling an exercise of his prerogative.[53] The ministers resigned, and the Commons addressed the king, praying him to call such persons only to his councils as would promote the passing of the reform bill.[54] The Duke of Wellington having failed to form a government of declared anti-reformers, ready to devise a measure of reform at once satisfactory to the people and to the House of Lords,[55] the ministers were recalled.
Another pressure was now brought to bear upon the House of Lords, – irregular and unconstitutional indeed, but necessary to avert revolution on the one hand, and to save the peers from harsh coercion, on the other. The king having at length agreed to create a sufficient number of peers to carry the bill,[56] – yet anxious to [p.144] avoid so extreme a measure, – averted the dangers of a great political crisis, by a timely interference. Some of the most violent peers were first dissuaded from proceeding- to extremities; and on the 17th May, the following circular letter was addressed, without the knowledge of ministers, to the opposition peers: –
“My dear Lord, – I am honoured with his Majesty's commands to acquaint your lordship, that all difficulties to the arrangements in progress will be obviated by a declaration in the House to-night from a sufficient number of peers, that in consequence of the present state of affairs, they have come to the resolution of dropping their further opposition to the Reform Bill so that it may pass without delay, and as nearly as possible in its present shape.
I have the honour to be, &c,”
Herbert Taylor.[57]
The peers took this suggestion, and yielded. Had they continued their resistance, a creation of peers could not have been avoided. This interference of the king with the independent deliberations of the House of Lords was, in truth, an act no less unconstitutional than a creation of peers, – the one being an irregular interference of the crown with the freedom of Parliament, – the other an extreme exercise of an undoubted prerogative. But it was resorted to, – not to extend the authority of the crown, or to overawe Parliament, – but to restore harmonious action to those powers of the state, which had been [p.145] brought into dangerous opposition and conflict.[58] In singular contrast to the history of past times, this greatest extension of the liberties of the people was now obtained, in the last resort, by the personal influence of the crown.
Two years after these great events, the prerogatives of the crown were again called into activity, in a manner which seemed to revive the political history of 1784. Earl Grey's government had lost the confidence of the king. His Majesty had already become apprehensive of danger to the church, when his alarm was increased by the retirement of Lord Stanley, Sir J. Graham, and two other members of the cabinet, on the question of the appropriation of the surplus revenues of the church in Ireland. And without consulting his ministers, he gave public expression to this alarm, in replying to an address of the prelates and clergy of Ireland.[59] The ministry of Earl Grey, enfeebled by the retirement of their colleagues, by disunion, and other embarrassments, soon afterwards resigned. Though they had already lost their popularity, they continued to command a large majority in the House of Commons. Lord Melbourne's administration, which succeeded, was composed of the same materials, and represented the great liberal party, and its parliamentary majority. Lord Melbourne had concluded the business of the [p.146] session of 1834, with the full support of this majority. But the king, who had withdrawn his confidence from Earl Grey, reposed it still less in Lord Melbourne, – having, in the meantime, become entirely converted to the political opinions of the opposition.
In October, the death of Earl Spencer having removed his son. Lord Althorp, from the leadership of the House of Commons, and from his office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, the king seized this opportunity for suddenly dismissing his ministers; and proceeded to consult the Duke of Wellington upon the formation of a government, from the opposite party.[60] Lord Althorp's elevation to the House of Lords rendered necessary a partial reconstruction of the ministry: but assuredly that circumstance alone would not have suggested the propriety of taking counsel with those who constituted but a small minority of the House of Commons. Lord Melbourne proposed to supply the place of Lord Althorp by Lord John Russell, – a far abler man: but the king was determined that the ministry should be dissolved. All the accustomed grounds for dismissing a ministry were wanting. There was no immediate difference of opinion between them and the king, upon any measure, or question of public policy: there was no disunion among themselves: nor were there any indications that they had lost the confidence of Parliament. [p.147] But the accidental removal of a single minister, – not necessarily from the government, but only from one House of Parliament to the other, – was made the occasion for dismissing the entire administration. It is true that the king viewed with apprehension the policy of his ministers in regard to the Irish church: but his assent was not then required to any specific measure of which he disapproved, nor was this the ground assigned for their dismissal. The right of the king to dismiss his ministers was unquestionable: but constitutional usage has prescribed certain conditions under which this right should be exercised. It should be exercised solely in the interests of the state, and on grounds which can be justified to Parliament, – to whom, as well as to the king, the ministers are responsible. Even in 1784, when George III. had determined to crush the coalition ministry, he did not venture to dismiss them, until they had been defeated in the House of Lords, upon Mr. Fox's India Bill. And again, in 1807, the ministers were at issue with the king upon a grave constitutional question, before he proceeded to form another ministry. But here it was not directly alleged that the ministers had lost the confidence of the king; and so little could it be affirmed that they had lost the confidence of Parliament, that an immediate dissolution was counselled by the new administration. The act of the king bore too much the impress of his personal will, and too little of those reasons of state policy by which it should have been prompted: but its impolicy was [p.148] so signal as to throw into the shade its unconstitutional character.
The Duke of Wellington advised his Majesty that the difficult task of forming a new administration, should be entrusted to Sir Robert Peel. But such had been the suddenness of the King's resolution, that Sir Robert, wholly unprepared for any political changes, was then at Rome. The duke, however, promptly met this difficulty by accepting the office of first lord of the Treasury himself, until Sir Robert Peel's arrival. He also held the seals of one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, which, – as there was no other secretary, – constituted his grace secretary for the home, the foreign and the colonial departments. His sole colleague was Lord Lyndhurst, who was entrusted with the great seal: but still retained the office of Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer.
This assumption of the government by a single man, while Parliament was not sitting, – avowedly for the purpose of forming an administration from a party whose following comprised less than a fourth of the House of Commons,[61] – presented an unpromising view of constitutional government, after the Reform Act.
In defence of this concentration of offices, the precedent of the Duke of Shrewsbury was cited, who, in the last days of Queen Anne, had held the several [p.149] offices of Lord High Treasurer, Lord Chamberlain, and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.[62] But the critical emergency of that occasion scarcely afforded an example to be followed, except where some public danger is to be averted. The queen was upon her death-bed: the succession was disputed, – a civil war was impending, – and the queen's ministers had been in secret correspondence with the Pretender. At such a time of peril, any means of strengthening the executive authority was justifiable: but to resort to a similar expedient, when no danger threatened the state, merely for the purpose of concerting ministerial arrangements and party combinations, – if justifiable on other grounds, – could scarcely be defended on the plea of precedent. Its justification, if possible, was rather to be sought in the temporary and provisional nature of the arrangement. The king, having dismissed his ministers, had resolved to entrust to Sir Robert Peel the formation of another ministry. The accident of that statesman's absence deferred, for a time, the carrying out of his Majesty's resolution; and the Duke of Wellington, in the interval, administered the executive business of several departments of the government, in the same manner as outgoing ministers generally undertake its administration, until their successors are appointed. The provisional character of this inter-ministerial government was shown by the circumstances stated by the duke himself, “that during the whole time he held the [p.150] seals, there was not a single office disposed of, nor au act done, which was not essentially necessary for the service of the king, and of the country.”[63] That it was an expedient of doubtful and anomalous character, – which, if drawn into precedent, might be the means of abuses dangerous to the state, – could scarcely be denied: but as the duke had exercised the extraordinary powers entrusted to him, with honour and good faith, his conduct, though exposed to invective, ridicule, and caricature,[64] did not become an object of parliamentary censure. Such was the temper of the House of Commons, that had the duke's “dictatorship,” – as it was called, – been more open to animadversion, it had little to expect from their forbearance.
If any man could have accomplished the task which the king had so inconsiderately imposed upon his minister, Sir Robert Peel was unquestionably the man most likely to succeed. He perceived at once the impossibility of meeting the existing House of Commons, at the head of a Tory administration; and the king was therefore advised to dissolve Parliament.
So completely had the theory of ministerial responsibility been now established, that, though Sir Robert Peel was out of the realm when the late ministers were dismissed, – though he could have had no cognizance [p.151] of the causes which induced the king to dismiss them, – though the Duke of Wellington had been invested with the sole government of the country, without his knowledge, – he yet boldly avowed that, by accepting office after these events, he became constitutionally responsible for them all, – as if he had himself advised them.[65] He did not attempt, like the ministers of 1807, to absolve himself from censure for the acts of the crown, and at the same time to denounce the criticism of Parliament, as an arraignment of the personal conduct of the king: but manfully accepted the full responsibility which had devolved upon him.
The minister could scarcely have expected to obtain a majority in the new Parliament: but he relied upon the reaction in favour of Tory principles, which he knew to have commenced in the country, and which had encouraged the king to dismiss Lord Melbourne. His party was greatly strengthened by the elections: but was still unequal to the force of the opposition. Yet he hoped for forbearance, and a “fair trial;” and trusted to the eventual success of a policy as liberal, in its general outline, as that of the Whigs. But he had only disappointments and provocations to endure. A hostile and enraged majority confronted him in the House of Commons, – comprising every section of the “liberal party,” – and determined to give him no quarter. He was defeated on the election of the Speaker, where at least he had deemed himself [p.152] secure; and again upon the address, when an amendment was voted condemning the recent dissolution as unnecessary;[66] and, – not to mention minor discomfitures, – he was at length defeated on a resolution, affirming that no measure on the subject of tithes in Ireland would be satisfactory, that did not provide for the appropriation of the surplus revenues of the Irish Church.[67]
These few weeks formed the most brilliant episode in Sir Robert Peel's distinguished parliamentary career. He combined the temper, tact, and courage of a great political leader, with oratory of a higher order than he had ever previously attained. He displayed all the great qualities by which Mr. Pitt had been distinguished, in face of an adverse majority, with a more conciliating temper, and a bearing less haughty. Under similar circumstances, perhaps, his success might have been equal. But Mr. Pitt had still a dissolution before him, supported by the vast influence of the crown: Sir Robert Peel had already tried that venture, under every disadvantage: he found the king's confidence a broken staff, – and no resource was left him, but an honourable retirement from a hopeless struggle.[68]
[p.153]
He resigned, and Lord Melbourne’s government, with some alterations, was reinstated. The stroke of prerogative had failed; and its failure offers an instructive illustration of the effects of the Reform Act, in diminishing the ascendent influence of the crown. In George the Third's time, the dismissal of a ministry by the king, and the transfer of his confidence to their opponents, – followed by an appeal to the country, – would certainly have secured a majority for the new ministers. Such had been the effect of a dissolution in 1784, after the dismissal of the coalition ministry: such had been the effect of a dissolution in 1807, on the dismissal of Lord Grenville. But the failure of this attempt to convert Parliament from one policy to another, by the prerogative and influence of the crown, proved that the opinion of the people must now be changed, before ministers can reckon upon a conversion of Parliament. It is true that the whole of these proceedings had been ill advised on the part of the king, even in the interests of the party whom he was anxious to serve: but there had been times within the memory of many statesmen then living, when equal indiscretion would not have incurred the least risk of defeat.
The second ministry of Lord Melbourne, though rapidly sinking in the estimation of their own supporters, – and especially of the extreme, or radical party, – while their opponents were gaining strength and popularity in the country, – continued in office during the two [p.154] remaining years of the king's reign, without recovering his favour.[69]
Her Majesty, on her most auspicious accession to the throne, finding them the ministers of the crown, at once honoured them with her entire confidence. The occasion was especially favourable for ministers to secure and perpetuate such confidence. The young queen, having no political experience, was without predilections; and the impressions first made upon her mind were likely to be lasting. A royal household was immediately to be organised for her Majesty, comprising not merely the officers of state and ceremony; but, – what was more important to a queen, – all the ladies of her court. Ministers appointed the former, as usual, from among their own parliamentary supporters; and extended the same principle of selection to the latter. Nearly all the ladies of the new court were related to the ministers themselves, or to their political adherents. The entire court thus became identified with the ministers of the day. If such an arrangement was calculated to ensure the confidence of the crown, – and who could doubt that it was? – it necessarily involved the principle of replacing this household with another, on a change of ministry. This was foreseen at the time, and soon afterwards became a question of no little constitutional difficulty.
The favour of ministers at court became a subject [p.155] f jealousy, and even of reproach, amongst their opponents: but the age had passed away, in which court favour alone could uphold a falling ministry against public opinion. They were
weaker now, with the court on their side, than they had been during the late reign, with the influence of the king and his court opposed to them; and in May, 1839, were obliged to offer their resignation. Sir Robert Peel, being charged with the formation of a new administration, had to consider the peculiar position of the household. Since Lord Moira's memorable negotiations in 1812, there had been no difficulties regarding those offices in the household, which were included in ministerial changes: but the court of a queen, constituted like the present, raised a new and embarrassing question.[70] To remove from the society of her Majesty, those ladies who were immediately about her person, appeared like an interference with her family circle, rather than with her household. Yet could ministers undertake the government, if the queen continued to be surrounded by the wives, sisters, and other near relatives of their political opponents? They decided that they could not; and Sir Robert Peel went to the palace to acquaint her Majesty that the ministerial changes would comprise the higher offices of her court occupied by ladies, including the ladies of her bedchamber. The queen met him by at once declaring that she could not admit any change of the ladies of her household. On appealing to Lord [p.156] John Russell on this subject, her Majesty was assured that she was justified, by usage, in declining the change proposed; and afterwards, by the advice of Lord Melbourne and his colleagues, she addressed a letter to Sir Robert Peel, stating that she could not “consent to adopt a course which she conceived to be contrary to usage, and which was repugnant to her feelings.”[71] Sir Robert Peel, on the receipt of this letter, wrote to her Majesty to resign the trust he had undertaken: stating that it was essential to the success of the commission with which he had been honoured “that he should have that public proof of her Majesty's entire support and confidence, which would be afforded by the permission to make some changes in that part of her Majesty's household, which her Majesty resolved on maintaining entirely without change.”[72] By a minute of the cabinet, immediately after these events, the ministry of Lord Melbourne recorded their opinion “that for the purpose of giving to the administration that character of efficiency and stability, and those marks of constitutional support of the crown, which are required to enable it to act usefully to the public service, it is reasonable that the great offices of the court, and situations in the household held by members of Parliament, should be included in the political arrangements made on a change of the administration; but they are not of opinion that a similar principle should be applied, or extended, to [p.157] the offices held by ladies in Her Majesty's household.”[73]
In the ministerial explanations which ensued, Sir Robert Peel pointed out forcibly the difficulties which any minister must be prepared to encounter, who should leave about her Majesty's person the nearest relatives of his political opponents. It had not been his intention to suggest the removal of ladies, – even from the higher offices of the household, – who were free from strong party or political connection: but those who were nearly related to the outgoing ministers, he bad deemed it impossible to retain. Ministers, on the other hand, maintained that they were supported by precedents, in the advice which they had tendered to her Majesty. They referred to the examples of Lady Sunderland and Lady Rialton, who had remained in the bedchamber of Queen Anne, for a year and a half after the dismissal of their husbands from office; and to the uniform practice by which the ladies of the household of every queen consort had been retained, on changes of administration, notwithstanding their close relationship to men engaged in political life. Ministers also insisted much upon the respect due to the personal feelings of her Majesty, and to her natural repugnance to sacrifice her domestic society to political arrangements.[74]
The “Bedchamber Question” saved Lord [p.158] Melbourne's government for a further term. Sir Robert Peel had experienced the evil consequences of the late king's premature recall of his party to office; and his prospects in the country were not even yet assured. The immediate result of the bedchamber question was, therefore, not less satisfactory to himself than to ministers. The latter gained no moral strength, by owing their continuance in office to such a cause; while the former was prepared to profit by their increasing weakness. The queen's confidence in her ministers was undiminished; yet they continued to lose ground in Parliament, and in the country. In 1841, the opposition, being fully assured of their growing strength, obtained, by a majority of one, a resolution of the Commons, affirming that ministers had not the confidence of the House; and “that their continuance in office, under such circumstances, was at variance with the spirit of the constitution.” The country was immediately appealed to upon this issue; and it soon became clear that the country was also adverse to the ministers. Delay had been fatal to them, while it had assured the triumph of their opponents. At the meeting of the new Parliament, amendments to the address were agreed to in both Houses, by large majorities, repeating the verdict of the late House of Commons.[75]
Sir Robert Robert Peel was now called upon, at a time of his own choosing, to form a government. Supported by Parliament [p.159] and the country, he had nothing to fear from court influence, even if there had been any disposition to use it against him. No difficulties were again raised on the bedchamber question. Her Majesty was now sensible that the position she had once been advised to assert, was constitutionally untenable. The principle which Sir Robert Peel applied to the household, has since been admitted, on all sides, to be constitutional. The offices of mistress of the robes and ladies of the bedchamber, when held by ladies connected with the out-going ministers, have been considered as included in the ministerial arrangements. But ladies of the bedchamber belonging to families whose political connection has been less pronounced, have been suffered to remain in the household, without objection, on a change of ministry.
In 1851, an incident occurred which illustrates the relation of ministers to the crown, – the discretion vested in them, – and the circumstances under which the pleasure of the sovereign is to be signified, concerning acts of the executive government. To all important acts, by which the crown becomes committed, it had been generally acknowledged that the sanction of the sovereign must be previously signified. And in 1850, her Majesty communicated to Lord Palmerston, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, – through Lord John Russell, her first minister, – a memorandum, giving specific directions as to the transaction of business between the crown and the secretary of state. It was in these words: – “The [p.160] queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction. Secondly, having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the minister. Such au act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and the foreign ministers, before important decisions are taken, based upon that intercourse: to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to have the drafts for her approval, sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents, before they must be sent off.[76]
Such being the relations of the foreign secretary to the crown, the sovereign is advised upon questions of foreign policy by her first minister, to whom copies of despatches and other information are also communicated, in order to enable him to give such advice effectually.[77] In controlling one minister, the sovereign yet acts upon the counsels and responsibility of another.
Immediately after the coup d’état of the 2nd December, 1851, in Paris, the cabinet determined that the government of this country should abstain from any [p.161] interference in the internal affairs of France; and a despatch to that effect, approved by the queen, was addressed to Lord Normanby, the British ambassador in Paris. But before this official communication was written, it appeared that M. Walewski, the French ambassador at the Court of St. James's, had assured his own government, that Lord Palmerston had “expressed to him his entire approbation of the act of the president, and his conviction that he could not have acted otherwise than he had done.” This statement having been communicated to Lord Normanby by M. Turgot, was reported by him to Lord Palmerston. On receiving a copy of Lord Normanby's letter, Lord John Russell immediately wrote to Lord Palmerston requiring explanations of the variance between his verbal communications with the French ambassador, and the despatch agreed upon by the cabinet; and a few days afterwards her Majesty also demanded similar explanations. These were delayed for several days; and in the meantime, in reply to another letter from Lord Normanby, Lord Palmerston, on the 16th of December, wrote to his lordship, explaining his own views in favour of the policy of the recent coup d’état. On receiving a copy of this correspondence, Lord John Russell conceived that the secretary of state was not justified in expressing such opinions without the sanction of the crown and the concurrence of the cabinet, – more particularly as these opinions were opposed to the policy of non-intervention upon which the cabinet had determined, and inconsistent with that moral support and sympathy, [p.162] which England had generally offered to constitutional government in foreign countries. The explanations which ensued were not deemed satisfactory; and Lord Palmerston was accordingly removed from office, on the ground that he had exceeded his authority as secretary of state, and had taken upon himself alone, to be the organ of the queen's government.[78]
In defence of his own conduct, Lord Palmerston, while fully recognising the principles upon which a secretary of state is required to act in relation to the crown and his own colleagues, explained that his conversation with Count Walewski on the 3rd of December, and his explanatory letter to Lord Normanby on the 16th, were not inconsistent with the policy of non-intervention upon which the cabinet had resolved: that whatever opinions he might have expressed, were merely his own; and that he had given no official instructions or assurances on the part of the government, except in the dispatch of the 5th of December, which her Majesty and the cabinet had approved.
Though the premier and the secretary of state had differed as to the propriety of the particular acts of the latter, they were agreed upon the general principles which regulate the relations of ministers to the crown. These events exemplify the effective control which the crown constitutionally exercises in the government of the country. The policy and conduct of its ministers are subject to its active [p.163] supervision. In minor affairs the ministers have a separate discretion, in their several departments: but in the general acts of the government, the crown is to be consulted, and has a control over them all.
From this time no question has arisen concerning the exercise of the prerogatives or influence of the crown, which calls for notice. Both have been exercised wisely, justly, and in the true spirit of the constitution. Ministers, enjoying the confidence of Parliament, have never claimed in vain the confidence of the crown. Their measures have not been thwarted by secret influence, and irresponsible advice. Their policy has been directed by Parliament and public opinion, and not by the will of the sovereign, or the intrigues of the court. Vast as is the power of the crown, it has been exercised, throughout the present reign, by the advice of responsible ministers, in a constitutional manner, and for legitimate objects. It has been held in trust, as it were, for the benefit of the people. Hence it has ceased to excite either the jealousy of rival parties, or popular discontents. This judicious exercise of the royal authority, while it has conduced to the good government of the state, has sustained the moral influence of the crown; and the devoted loyalty of a free people, which her Majesty's personal virtues have merited, has never been disturbed by the voice of faction.[79]
[p.164]
But while the influence of the crown in the government of the country has been gradually brought into subordination to Parliament and public opinion, the same causes, which, for more than a century and a half, contributed to its enlargement, have never ceased to add to its greatness. The national expenditure and public establishments have been increased to an extent that alarms financiers: armies and navies have been maintained, such as at no former period had been endured in time of peace. Our colonies have expanded into a vast and populous empire; and her Majesty, invested with the sovereignty of the East Indies, now rules over two hundred millions of Asiatic subjects. Governors, commanders-in-chief, and bishops attest her supremacy in all parts of the world; and the greatness of the British empire, while it has redounded to the glory of England, has widely extended the influence of the crown. As that influence, constitutionally exercised, has ceased to be regarded with jealousy, its continued enlargement has been watched by Parliament without any of those efforts to restrain it, which marked the parliamentary history of the eighteenth century. On the contrary, Parliament has met the increasing demands of a community rapidly advancing in population and wealth, by constant additions to the power and patronage of the crown. The judicial establishments of the country have been extended, by the appointment of more judges in the superior courts, – by a large staff of county court judges, with local jurisdiction, – and by numerous [p.165] stipendiary magistrates. Offices and commissions have been multiplied, for various public purposes; and all these appointments proceed from the same high source of patronage and preferment. Parliament has wisely excluded all these officers, with a few necessary exceptions, from the privilege of sitting in the House of Commons: but otherwise these extensive means of influence have been entrusted to the executive government, without any apprehension that they will be perverted to uses injurious to the freedom, or public interests of the country.
The history of the influence of the crown has now been sketched, for a period of one hundred years. We have seen George III. jealous of the great Whig families, and wresting power from the hands of his ministers; we have seen ministers becoming more accountable to Parliament, and less dependent upon the crown: but as in the commencement of this period, a few great families commanded the support of Parliament, and engrossed all the power of the state, – so under a more free representation, and more extended responsibilities, do we see nearly the same families still in the ascendant. Deprived, in great measure, of their direct influence over Parliament, – their general weight in the country, and in the councils of the state, had suffered little diminution. Notwithstanding the more democratic tendencies of later times, rank and station had still retained the respect and confidence of the people. When the aristocracy enjoyed too exclusive an influence in government, they aroused jealousies and hostility: [p.166] but when duly sharing power with other classes, and admitting the just claims of talent, they prevailed over every rival and adverse interest; and, – whatever party was in power, – were still the rulers of the state.
In a society comprising so many classes as that of England, the highest are willingly accepted as governors, when their personal qualities are not unequal to their position. They excite less jealousy than abler men of inferior social pretensions, who climb to power. Born and nurtured to influence, they have studied how to maintain it. That they have maintained it so well, against the encroachments of wealth, – an expanding society, and popular influences, is mainly due to their progressive policy. As they have been ready to advance with their age, the people have been content to acknowledge them as leaders: but had they endeavoured to stem the tide of public opinion, they would have been swept aside, while men from other classes advanced to power.